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Abstract
This paper seeks to understand the real influence that public diplomacy may have over American foreign
policy vis-à-vis its effect on public opinion. In order to examine that influence, the paper uses the case of
American intervention against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, ISIL, or Dash) to examine how
different kinds of elites influence American public opinion through political communication. It tests RM
Entman’s Cascading Activation model of elite influence as a framework to understand public diplomacy,
replicating his qualitative study of press coverage with specific focus on foreign sources. It also expands the
model by testing elites’ respective abilities to directly influence opinion, using a controlled randomized survey
experiment. The results of the mixed-method analysis demonstrate that elites from foreign countries, NGOs,
and transnational organizations may have greater influence over American foreign policy outcomes than
domestic elites outside of the President’s administration. These foreign and transnational elites are relied upon
by the press to define the realities of international crises long before the domestic debate on intervention
begins, limiting the range of appropriate responses to a crisis. Moreover, the quantitative experiment
demonstrated that Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi had greater influence on opinion regarding the
specifics of intervention policy than President Obama or Senator Harry Reid. These findings indicate that the
identity of the matters when attempting to influence American public opinion, and quantitative research may
help identify those who are best suited to promote a certain foreign policy goal.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 American foreign policy has long been defined by a polarized dichotomy between active 
interventionism and isolationism. These two forces have long been in conflict with each other, 
with the mood of the nation often coming into conflict with the realities of American interests 
abroad (Holmes, 2015). For example, the 1930s were a period of “deep introversion” when 
isolationism reigned, but the external realities of Pearl Harbor and World War II forced the nation 
back towards interventionism (Holmes, 2015). The current state of American foreign policy is no 
different. On September 27, 2014, The Economist published an article entitled “Mission 
Relaunched” on how the United States’ military involvement against the terrorist group known as 
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh) would define its role in the international 
community.  While discussing the relative decline of American world power and how the 1
continued interventionist role of the US against ISIL would define its role in world politics, the 
author comments that “America, meanwhile, seems swamped by the forces of disorder, either 
unable or unwilling to steady a world that is spinning out of control.”  Despite these internal 2
“forces of disorder,” a New York Times op-ed published on September 11, 2014, the day after 
President Obama announced an expanded intervention effort against ISIL, claimed that “by the 
time President Obama announced the authorization of airstrikes in Syria Wednesday night, he 
clearly felt that he had little choice militarily or politically” (emphasis added).  
 For the full article, please visit http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21620191-fight-against-islamic-state-will-1
help-define-americas-role-world-mission-relaunched?
spc=scode&spv=xm&ah=9d7f7ab945510a56fa6d37c30b6f1709
 For the full article, please visit http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21620191-fight-against-islamic-state-will-2
help-define-americas-role-world-mission-relaunched?
spc=scode&spv=xm&ah=9d7f7ab945510a56fa6d37c30b6f1709
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 With such strong anti-interventionist headwinds, it is truly remarkable that political 
pressure forced the president to act. The situation presents a distinct puzzle regarding how a 
mandate for military action coalesced in a war-weary America, and its answer lies in 
understanding public opinion. This dramatic shift between isolationism and interventionism is 
symptomatic of the influence of public opinion on foreign policy outcomes, preventing or 
enabling the mobilization of political capital necessary to legitimize “willing” intervention in 
international crises. With public opinion’s power to shape such important foreign policy 
decisions, it is only natural that elites would seek to influence this powerful political force to suit 
their own preferences.  
 Given the international nature of the crises that set the world “spinning out of control,” 
those who are significantly affected by these crises do not only live in the United States. Thus, 
the affected foreign governments, international institutions, and peoples have a critical interest in 
obtaining the aid and support of the American government in tackling the crises that affect them. 
As the push for expanded airstrikes against ISIL demonstrated, obtaining the support of the 
American public can be vital to the success of any effort to obtain aid. The processes of foreign 
and transnational actors advocating and obtaining widespread support for intervention in 
international crises falls distinctly in the area of public diplomacy. 
 This paper seeks to understand the real influence that public diplomacy may have over 
American foreign policy vis-à-vis its effect on public opinion. However, in order to study the 
effectiveness of public diplomacy on any foreign policy matter, public diplomacy must be 
understood within the context of the whole debate surrounding each issue. With a myriad of 
different messages attempting to influence public opinion on each foreign policy issue, the 
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effectiveness of public diplomacy can only be truly measured in comparison to domestic political 
communication. Since the public is generally uninformed about foreign policy issues, 
communication about foreign policy has a significant capacity to shift public opinion, especially 
when it comes to intervention (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). With this powerful political force up 
for grabs, understanding how foreign and domestic elites try to align public opinion with their 
preferences is critical to understanding the formation of foreign policy, particularly policy 
regarding intervention. However, not every elite is equally effective at influencing public 
opinion. 
 The leading model that outlines the hierarchy of elite influence over public opinion at the 
core of this thesis is Robert Entman’s Cascading Activation model. In this model, different 
foreign policy actors and elites have varying levels of influence over frames reported by the 
news media (Entman, 2004). These elites include both current and former leaders of domestic 
and foreign governments, their staff, government officials, and foreign policy experts outside of 
the government. However, Entman’s study only presents enough research to give a theoretical 
outline to the general hierarchy of these elites’ respective influence, and he spends little time on 
communication from foreign elites. I extend his model by adding further empirical evidence to 
test its validity and, if the evidence supports it, to use the Cascading Activation model to 
understand public diplomacy’s influence on American foreign policy. Using mixed-method 
analysis to evaluate this evidence, I address whether there are significant differences in the extent 
to which domestic and international forces shape public opinion.  
 In a case study of contemporary news coverage, I attempt to replicate the study upon 
which Entman bases his model with some slight methodological alterations in order to examine 
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how news coverage may affect policy decisions as well as public opinion. By examining how the 
news treats frames originating from different “news-worthy” sources during a critical period 
surrounding a high-profile foreign policy announcement, this study hopes to determine how 
Entman’s proposed differences in elite influence over news frames may affect policy outcomes.  
 To bolster the findings of the qualitative case study, this paper also pairs it with a 
randomized controlled survey experiment that quantitatively measures the effects of 
communication from domestic and foreign sources on public opinion. By not only observing 
how frames from foreign sources are treated by the domestic press but also how frames from 
different elites are processed by their intended audience, I hope to establish a stronger link 
between communication and the resulting political pressure for intervention. Adding this 
quantitative aspect to a study of both Entman’s model and public diplomacy will not only help 
depict how this particular form of political communication can influence foreign policy, but it 
will also introduce an additional method of inquiry into the still nascent field of public 
diplomacy. 
Defining Public Diplomacy 
 Public diplomacy is a subfield of political science still in formation. Even the definition 
of the term “public diplomacy” has changed dramatically since the field began to take shape in 
the 1980s. The study of public diplomacy emerged during the Cold War with “the struggle for 
hearts and minds” raging throughout the world, and it has developed alongside the monumental 
and interrelated shifts in international relations, politics, and mass communications (Gilboa, 
2008). The Cold War origins of public diplomacy scholarship can be seen in Malone’s 1985 
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definition of public diplomacy as direct communication with foreign peoples. HN Tuch (1990) 
expands this definition to provide purpose for this communication, saying that public diplomacy 
was a government’s communication process with foreign publics to build understanding for its 
nation’s “ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies.” 
Frederick (1993) provides purpose for that understanding, saying that it was intended to 
influence foreign governments by influencing their citizens. 
 Due to the indirect nature of public diplomacy’s influence on foreign governments in this 
Cold War-era definition, international relations scholars have often equated public diplomacy to 
soft power, citing that they both involve communication, education, and persuasion to influence 
foreign policy rather than the traditional economic or military force (Gilboa, 2008). However, the 
use of the term “soft power” should not be mistakenly interpreted to mean that this non-
traditional foreign policy tool is less important than more tangible ones. New goals and means of 
foreign policy emerging from the end of the Cold War, a number of democratic revolutions 
around the world, and the development of global 24-hour news and the Internet have emphasized 
that favorable image and reputation are now critical aspects of a nation’s foreign policy (Gilboa, 
2008). Some scholars have even gone so far as to say that public diplomacy, as the means to 
obtain favorable image and reputation and utilize them accordingly, has become more central to 
foreign policy than traditional power politics (Melissen, 2005). However, limiting the definition 
of public diplomacy to national governments attempting to win over the foreign public is a 
drastic oversimplification, as it completely ignores non-state actors. Given the post-Cold War 
developments in mass communications and the rise of non-state actors in the arena of 
international politics, more recent scholarship extends the scope of public diplomacy to include 
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the use of the media and other channels of communication by state and non-state actors to 
influence public opinion in foreign societies (Gilboa 2000, 2001).  
 Within this definition of public diplomacy, there are different avenues to influence 
attitudes and policy reflected in three different models. The Basic Cold War model reflects the 
original zero sum game between governments, where each state attempts to win the support of 
the people in a foreign nation and use that support to influence that nation’s foreign policy 
choices. The Nonstate Transnational model incorporates the advent of nonstate actors and the 
development of the global media, in which actors exploit the global media to build support for 
their causes amongst the public who then pressure their governments to act. Finally, the 
Domestic Public Relations model factors in the processes of government and the use of public 
opinion polling, where foreign governments hire lobbyists and political consultants in a target 
country with the express intent of influencing foreign policy (Gilboa, 2008). In this paper, I limit 
my examination to the Nonstate Transnational model model, as I seek to observe how 
communication from leaders of both foreign governments and transnational organizations can 
influence public support for intervention. 
Political Communication and Public Diplomacy 
 Though the study of public diplomacy involves examining how or why one actor is able 
to exert influence over another’s foreign policy, there has been little systematic research into 
directly identifying and quantifying that influence. In his review of public diplomacy literature, 
Eytan Gilboa (2008) recognized that public diplomacy scholarship generally took the form of 
analytical historical accounts. These studies have made relatively limited contributions to the 
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development of public diplomacy theory and methodology due to their methodological 
homogeneity (Gilboa, 2008). The resulting lack of quantifiable evidence leaves a significant gap 
in analytical capabilities concerning extremely volatile and important events such as 
international conflicts and humanitarian crises. With lives, international reputations, and 
countries’ futures at stake, every possible avenue of exploration should be taken in order to 
answer questions that facilitate crisis resolution. Since public legitimacy is critical to the fate of 
any policy handling international crises, we must ask ourselves, “Do world leaders really have 
the ability to directly influence public opinion in foreign countries when it comes to policy 
preferences?” If so, we must take the steps necessary to discover which foreign leaders are seen 
as the most legitimate partners by the American public and enlist their help. 
 This study takes a different approach to the study of public diplomacy that I believe can 
help answer these questions. As Gilboa (2008) noted, scholars of public diplomacy rarely utilize 
political communications theory in their studies. This lack of developed scholarship presents an 
opportunity to marry a number of existing areas of inquiry to provide new depth to our 
understanding of public diplomacy. Since the Nonstate Transnational model describes the use of 
the global media to build international support for a cause, studying how this particular form of 
political communications affects opinion is critical to understanding the power of public 
diplomacy. In other words, I believe that quantifiably measuring and comparing the effects of 
political communication from different leaders may reveal the extent of these elites’ influence on 
foreign policy decisions regarding international conflict. These beliefs are predicated on a 
constructivist view of international relations where individual leaders and the nature of the 
institutions are critical to understanding policy outcomes, as I am claiming that both individuals 
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representing nations and international organizations and the public opinion in the involved 
countries could matter in the outcomes of a nation’s foreign policy calculus.  
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Chapter 2: Public Diplomacy and the Principles of Political Communication 
Indexing Theory, The Press, and Elite-Driven Opinion 
 Since this study focuses on the influence of political communications inherent in the 
Nonstate Transnational Model, understanding how an elite’s attempt to influence opinion 
actually reaches the public is critical to understanding the influence of this form of public 
diplomacy. The process of political communication that links specific frames about an issue to 
public opinion originates in the press’s relationship with elites. In their need to craft cohesive 
narratives about different events and policies, the media turns to elites for information and 
opinion that can be used for content and inform their reporting (Entman, 2004). With the media 
influencing public opinion by reporting events and different elites’ reactions to them, 
understanding how elite opinion drives the frames in the media coverage is vital to understanding 
the underlying principles of Entman’s model.  
 At the most basic level of this relationship between elite opinion and media coverage is 
Indexing. Indexing theory claims that the sides of debate between elites are closely mirrored by 
the range of frames offered by the media (Bennett & Manheim, 1993). Thus, if there is little 
disagreement about a certain policy, the range of opinions shared by the media is relatively 
narrow, but that range widens if there is heated debate amongst elites. In this regard, the media 
functions as a vehicle for government officials and other elites to criticize each other rather than 
offering its own substantive and independent contribution to the foreign policy debate (Mermin, 
1999). Since the opinion of a reporter is rarely “newsworthy” outside of the editorial section, the 
media generally waits for another elite to offer a new counterframe and reports that frame instead 
of offering their own interpretation of events. The media’s resulting lack of original contributions 
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to the framing of foreign policy issues demonstrates that the elites who reporters rely on when 
crafting a narrative are the ones who drive public opinion. The ability to link frames to specific 
elites also allows for qualitative research that traces an elite opinion’s influence on the media by 
studying how coverage treats the frame that elite used to voice his or her opinion. 
 Entman finds that the range of opinions reported in the press is not the only way that 
coverage can affect opinion. The way that the press substantively treats a frame in their reporting 
can also effect the prevalence and power of the frame in public opinion (Entman, 2004). The 
“magnitude” of a frame can be affected in coverage through the number of mentions the frame is 
given in coverage, where those mentions occur in news coverage concerning relevant issues or 
events, and how a reporter treats the frame while discussing it (Entman, 2004). The reporter’s 
treatment of the frame can either highlight the frame as newsworthy or simply include it as a 
matter of following the norms of “fair reporting” procedure, which reduces the frame’s capacity 
to activate the desired schemas and shift public opinion (Entman, 2004). By prioritizing certain 
sources as more “news-worthy” than others, reporters relegate statements from actors they label 
as “less influential” or as “merely used to balance the coverage” to the back pages of papers and 
the bottom of articles, minimizing the impact of what these “less important” elites say on public 
opinion (Entman, 2004). Thus, by examining the frequency and placement of frames in news 
coverage as indicators of what the media believes is most important, one can determine which 
elites have significant influence over the media’s thinking concerning relevant events and issues.  
 A particularly relevant finding from Entman’s study concerns the press’s treatment of 
foreign sources as a secondary source of policy opposition. Entman specifically notes that when 
there is little domestic opposition to a policy, the press only then turns to foreign sources in order 
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to “balance” their coverage with criticism of White House policy (Entman, 2004). To illustrate 
this finding, he uses the examples of military intervention in Grenada, Libya, and Panama under 
Presidents Reagan and H.W. Bush. In these cases, Entman finds that due to widespread public 
support for intervention, “open debate among U.S. elites did not break out… because journalists 
had almost no sources to quote who cast doubt on the administration’s framing of the 
problem” (Entman, 2004). Instead, “the source of many critical assertions was foreign” (Entman, 
2004). In certain circumstances, this finding seems somewhat suspect due to other media 
pressures that Entman outlines. For example, some of those foreign sources could determine 
their own nation’s policy and thereby have a great deal of influence over how the United States 
ultimately acts in the arena of foreign relations. However, if the media’s use of foreign sources is, 
in fact, limited to times of relative domestic unity, their public diplomacy efforts would have 
little influence over public opinion concerning any American foreign policy. 
 Entman also notes that despite the press’s ability to weave together narratives and to 
expose different frames to the public, it is ultimately up to each individual audience to digest the 
information they receive (Entman, 2004). Therefore, even if a frame is given secondary 
treatment in news coverage, it can still become salient in public opinion given the right 
circumstances. However, the media’s agenda setting power by priming certain frames over others 
means that how the press processes and communicates the frames from elites often helps 
determine how the public thinks about an issue. The multiple pressures on the press to maintain 
balanced coverage and help predict future events in a limited amount of space for content lead 
reporters to treat frames from different sources in different ways. Thus, not every elite will have 
the same level of influence over press coverage, and therefore not every elite will have the same 
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capability to influence public opinion. Once a frame has been included in news content, however, 
it becomes critical to understand how the public internalizes that information and factors it into 
opinion formulation. 
Framing, Priming, and Public Opinion 
 First and foremost amongst the relevant forces in political communications is framing. 
Framing, as Entman defines it, is the selective highlighting of certain facets of events or issues 
and making connections between them to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or 
solution (Entman, 2004). As my study is in part an attempt to expand Entman’s Cascading 
Activation model to consider public diplomacy efforts more extensively, I have chosen to follow 
his definition of framing as well. 
 Within the larger definition of framing, he distinguishes two categories of frames, 
substantive and procedural. Substantive frames involve defining effects or conditions as 
problematic, identifying causes, conveying moral judgment, or endorsing remedies or 
improvements (Entman, 2004). One hypothetical example relevant to public diplomacy would be 
when the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein) promotes some 
form of aid to a conflict he calls a “humanitarian crisis.” In this hypothetical, the conflict is the 
cause of the situation defined using a moral judgment and aid is the endorsed remedy. Procedural 
frames deal with the legitimacy of political actors based on technique, success, and/or 
representativeness (Entman, 2004). For example, a member of Congress could contest the 
President’s decision to use certain levels of military force without congressional approval by 
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objecting to the constitutionality of the decision, utilizing a “technique-based” procedural frame  
to question the move’s legal legitimacy. 
 Frames interact with interpretive schemas in the minds of the public, which are 
psychologically grouped clusters of information people use to process similar ideas and events, 
understand them, and evaluate them accordingly (Entman, 2004). Schemas enter long-term 
memory, and any new information that plays into one of them has the potential to bring up 
feelings associated with the original events that put the schema into place. Once entrenched, 
these first impressions are “difficult to dislodge,” as Entman puts it (Entman, 2004). Schemas 
may not only include memories of prior events related to the new information being processed, 
but they also may include evaluations of the individuals who communicate the information to 
them and of the institutions those individuals are tied to. Substantial criticism from Ayatollah 
Khameni of Iran, for example, may be inherently rejected by the American public regardless of 
its merit due to their views of Khameni and the nation he leads. This inherent legitimacy built 
into the cognitive schemas of the public plays into the capacity of different public figures to 
affect Entman’s framing competition, a process which this study hopes to observe.  
 Though the use of schemas to evaluate new information occurs in the minds of 
individuals, Entman treats the schemas in the minds of members of the public as relatively 
monolithic. However schemas are far from monolithic, as different people bring different 
cognitive experiences to the same events. Similar to how the media indexes elite opinion in news 
coverage, I believe that public opinion measurements index a range of schemas. For example, 
liberals and conservatives may interpret the same frame from the same source in different ways 
based on their pre-existing opinion about the person communicating that frame. This pre-existing 
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opinion may originate, in part, from their ideological schemas. These similarities amongst 
individuals’ cognitive processing of frames can be measured through controlled experimentation 
using priming. 
 Priming is another effect closely tied to the framing process in political communication 
that also shifts public opinion. By priming, or drawing attention to, an international crisis, public 
opinion may shift because the most recently and frequently considered information has greater 
influence over decision making- often called an agenda-setting effect (Iyengar et. al, 1984, 
Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). The agenda-setting effects of priming makes it a useful tool in 
controlled political science experiments, as it allows researchers to identify a causal relationship 
between the primed content and a subsequent shift in the experimental group’s opinions in 
comparison to a control group. When the public is primed on a certain issue, opinions about its 
most relevant aspects are effected the most. This shift is especially prevalent when discussing 
low-knowledge issues such as foreign affairs. Krosnick & Kinder’s study (1990) highlights the 
power of priming on low-knowledge issues, finding shifts in opinion on intervention and 
isolationism were especially noticeable. Not only does this finding support the potential for 
efficacious public diplomacy efforts for military intervention, but it also indicates that there may 
be a similar influence on opinion concerning forms of intervention outside of direct military 
action, including the delivery of medical aid, arms, or economic aid.  
 Since Entman’s study relied on qualitative analysis of media coverage and historical 
public opinion polls, a controlled randomized survey experiment directly priming audiences with 
frames from different foreign policy elites may offer empirical support for his model with greater 
methodological depth. By comparing shifts in opinion between groups immediately after priming 
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them with statements from domestic or transnational actors about a relevant international crisis, I 
hope to determine measurable differences in the hierarchy of communicators in Entman’s 
cascade and thereby reveal their respective influences over said international crisis. I intend on 
combining the resulting comparisons of communication by domestic, international, and 
transnational actors in order to identify and understand the international and transnational actors 
true capacity to galvanize American public opinion and thereby influence American foreign 
policy. 
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Chapter 3: Entman’s Cascading Activation Model And Public Diplomacy 
Figure 1: Entman’s Cascading Network Activation Model  3
 Entman’s model hinges on the conflict that arises from elites’ need for public opinion’s 
political capital and their varying opinion-shaping capabilities. Since public opinion can be 
critical leverage against political opponents, presidents, chief foreign policy advisors, elites, and 
the media are all in a constant battle to control the dominant frame that reaches the public 
(Entman, 2004). However, since some individuals and actors have more power to influence that 
frame than others, Entman’s research outlines a tiered system of influence over press frames- 
 Taken from Entman (2004), p. 103
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hence the “cascade” (Entman, 2004). As can be seen in Figure 1 above, the institutional position 
of the elite can significantly influence the amount of control that elite will have over press 
framing (and therefore, public opinion), with the White House administration at the top, then 
other elites both in and out of official government office, and then the media.    
 Entman goes on to note that certain individuals can have greater influence over framing 
than other elites in their tier of the cascade or, indeed, even elites in higher positions in the 
cascade. In this case, Entman gives the example of a news anchor who is so trusted and respected 
that he or she could be considered an “Expert” in the higher tier when he opines on an issue and 
offers his own substantive frame (Entman, 2004). Thus, both the media’s and public’s regard for 
a specific elite can also effect how that elite’s frame is treated and internalized. The findings 
from this example reveal a deeper underlying claim than the superficial observation that 
institutional positions help determine the press treatment of elite opinion, which then influences 
how the public think about an issue. At the core of the Cascading Activation model is the belief 
that an elite’s identity, which combines both institutional and individual aspects, is critical to 
understanding his or her influence over public opinion. 
 Figure 1 also depicts the flow of  communication concerning a foreign policy issue or 
decision, helping illuminate the flow of information between levels of Entman’s cascade. The 
convergence of all elite opinion on the media depicted in the diagram demonstrates the influence 
the media has over both elite and public opinion. For example, when communication concerning 
foreign policy from the White House is reported by journalists, the main points of the 
administration’s frame are packaged into sound bytes that are then used to construct a narrative 
for news content. Opinion leaders and other elites outside of the administration then have the 
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chance to look over the White House’s stance, challenge or accept its frame, and offer a frame of 
their own. The media can factor these outside opinions into their coverage in a number of ways 
that either promote the counterframes or diminish their influence (Entman, 2004). This process 
works in reverse as well, as the media packages the “most important” public opinion measures 
into a narrative that affects the way elites, elected officials, and administration bureaucrats 
understand what the public wants. Thus, for Entman, the media’s reporting functions as the go-
between for the elite opinion leaders and the people, influencing both public opinion and policy 
outcomes. 
Entman’s Model and Its Place in the Field of Public Diplomacy  
 Adding further empirical evidence in support of Entman’s model and developing its 
understanding of foreign leaders’ place in the cascade would mean three things. First, it would 
mean that the Cascading Activation model would be a useful tool in the study of public 
diplomacy - “expanding” it to public diplomacy as Gilboa puts it (Gilboa, 2008). Second, it 
would mean that public opinion can be used as a sound, measurable indicator of what influence 
certain international actors wield in both general US foreign policy and specific crises. For 
example, statements promoting international intervention in a crisis by a UN representative 
might be able to shift public opinion in countries more than similar statements by a 
representative of a third party nation, indicating that the UN (or at least that spokesperson) has 
more legitimacy as a partner in intervention efforts than the third party nation (or their 
spokesperson). Finally, a confirmation of Entman’s model would lend further credence to the 
underlying assertion of the model, which is that press coverage creates or reflects the hierarchy 
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of influence that certain individual elites hold over public opinion concerning foreign policy. By 
combining content analysis with a controlled randomized survey experiment, this study will also 
reinforce Entman’s claims by directly observing how individual influence can affect how the 
public processes frames rather than simply implying influence by looking at timely polls. 
 Despite the potential for theoretical and methodological expansion in the field of public 
diplomacy built in to this study, it remains only a small step towards fully applying Entman’s 
model to this field of research. Political communication from a foreign source about a specific 
policy issue only breaches the depth of what public diplomacy can be, even within the Nonstate 
Transnational Model. Political communication that falls within this model can also include less 
pointed messages to build general support for an organization, nation, or cause that could 
eventually translate into favorable foreign policy. This use of positive affect to influence public 
opinion could also be studied using a similar methodology to the one which I propose in this 
paper, but I choose to focus more narrowly on what I see as the logical first step in adding 
quantitative communications research to the study of public diplomacy: foreign elites’ 
communication regarding specific US policies. 
 Second, this study (and the use of Entman’s model for that matter) only extends to 
foreign influence over US foreign policy. Though Gilboa notes that there has been little research 
into foreign public diplomacy efforts in the United States (Gilboa, 2008), neither Entman’s 
original model nor this study are necessarily generalizable to public diplomacy efforts in other 
nations. Further research is necessary to determine whether this paper’s findings can be 
replicated outside of the United States. 
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 Finally, this study only examines the influence of a certain aspect of public diplomacy 
efforts. Though the use of the global media to communicate with a target public and build 
support for a cause may be effective, there are other methods to influence a government’s foreign 
policy within the purview of public diplomacy that this study does not address. The Domestic 
Public Relations Model includes a wide variety of public diplomacy methods that use behind-
the-scenes methods to influence governmental decision making which deserve further research to 
compare their efficacy to the more public methods studied in this paper. 
 I believe this paper is also a step towards addressing the generalizability issues I have 
outlined. The issues discussed above reflect some of the methodological limitations of the 
current body of public diplomacy research, as controlled quantitative research has yet to be 
significantly applied to any model of public diplomacy. Though this lack of research limits the 
larger generalizability of this study, it also reveals a methodological gap that must be addressed. 
This paper is consequently an attempt to help build a body of research that uses the experimental 
methodology from the field of political communications to fill that gap. 
Hypotheses 
 Given that the case study in this paper focuses on how Entman’s Cascading Activation 
model can be applied to public diplomacy, the first question of this paper regards whether or not 
Entman’s model will be confirmed by my case study’s evidence. Due to his lack of focus on 
sources covered by the Nonstate Transnational model, I believe my examination of these sources’ 
efforts to influence public opinion will result in a more nuanced understanding of their place in 
Entman’s cascade. With influential foreign leaders and transnational organizations 
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constantly engaging in the struggle to secure public support for their preferences in 
American foreign policy, there should be a more distinct place for foreign elites in the 
cascade (H1). 
 Since the press acts as the mediator between elite and public opinion in Entman’s model, 
my second hypothesis (which is the first of the quantitative study) reflects the effects of media 
treatment of different sources on public opinion. In concordance with the Cascading 
Activation model, priming frames from different actors in the cascade will shift aggregate 
opinion to varying degrees (H2). In a sense, the way the media treats different sources in their 
coverage will be reflected in those sources’ relative capacities to influence public opinion. Within 
this hypothesis, however, there are a number of corollary hypotheses that relate to the different 
identities of the communicators and how they fit into the various cognitive schemas present in 
the minds of the people processing the new information offered by the primed frame. 
 First, I will address the different identities of the communicators. Even before the 
opinions of their audiences truly come into play, some of these communicators are more well-
known than others. A well-known, “higher-profile” communicator may lend more attention to the 
frame they are presenting to the audience than a relatively unknown one, regardless of the 
audience’s qualitative opinion of the individual relaying the information. Entman’s cascade 
reflects this hierarchy by placing the presidential administration in a level above that of other 
elites who do not have as high public profiles in the United States (Entman, 2004). However, 
simply placing the whole “administration” on one level of familiarity is an oversimplification, 
especially in an era when only one third of Americans are able to name all three branches of 
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government, let alone members of the administration outside of the President.  Thus, my first 4
corrollary hypothesis (H2A), is that American presidents will affect aggregate opinion more 
than any other individual communicator. After this peak position in the cascade, I believe the 
order put forth by Entman’s cascade will follow.  
 Given that there are generally few stories about foreign news in the American media 
(Lent, 1977; Robinson & Davis, 1990), I expect that there will likely be more familiarity with 
high-profile domestic elites than foreign ones. Therefore, I hypothesize that domestic elites 
outside of the administration will have more influence over aggregate opinion than less 
familiar international and transnational leaders, who will have the least amount of effect on 
aggregate opinion (H2B). 
 My next series of hypotheses deal with the how the different subsets of schemas that 
respondents bring to the experiment affect their responses after being primed. Though these 
hypotheses are related to the overall process of how Cascading Activation functions on a micro-
level, I wish to separate them from H2 as they do not deal with the affects of priming on 
aggregate opinion. Given appropriate sample sizes of survey respondents who fall into the 
categories I seek to measure, I will be able to evaluate these hypotheses by comparing responses 
to policy-related questions by demographic breakdowns. 
 Of the demographic characteristics that I will measure in my survey, I plan to specifically 
examine responses in relation to respondents’ education levels and partisan identification. 
Activation of opinion about foreign affairs has been shown to be prevalent in highly educated 
 See the Annenberg Public Policy Center Poll for the Civics Renewal Network, http://4
cdn.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Civics-survey-press-release-09-17-2014-for-PR-
Newswire.pdf
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individuals who are invested in their views (Robinson 1967 & 1972; Price & Zaller, 1993). 
Druckman and Holmes (2004) also show these individuals with higher levels of political 
sophistication about an issue strengthen their opinions rather than changing them when primed. 
However, these same politically sophisticated individuals, by definition, know more about 
politics and politicians than the average individual, so they are also more likely to be familiar 
with the “lower profile” international and transnational actors they are primed with. Thus, I 
hypothesize that priming these more educated respondents will be affected by agenda-
setting and reinforce their existing beliefs across all treatments, but there will also be a 
different hierarchy of actors in their cascade than less educated respondents (H3).  Higher 
political sophistication has also been shown to be significantly associated with increasingly 
partisan attitude structures (Zinni, Mattei, & Rhodebeck, 1997). Therefore, I predict that my 
findings related to primed respondents who self-identify as ideologically partisan will 
reveal a different hierarchy of influence than what is observed on aggregate (H4).  
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Chapter 4: The Experiment 
Entman’s Methodology and Qualitative Case Study Construction 
 Though Entman offers many insights into how the press treats elite opinion and how that 
may affect public opinion, his book, in my opinion, is more theory than rigorous empirical study. 
His book offers evidence for his model through qualitative case studies, but he does not really 
start out with a discreet hypothesis and often changes data sources, namely different channels’ 
nightly news broadcasts, without notice in between different chapters. Moreover, there is no 
experimental evidence in Entman’s study regarding the actual internalization of these competing 
frames by the public. He instead uses timely polls that can be influenced by confounding factors 
like methodological differences between polling organizations, poor question wording, and 
public opinion concerning issues that have nothing to do with the foreign policy in question. This 
lack of strong empirical evidence presents a significant issue with the complex, tiered system of 
influence over public opinion he proposes. Despite these issues, Entman’s study presents some 
methodological guidelines that can be used to attempt a more empirically focused recreation of 
his study. Furthermore, his inclusion of public opinion measurements in his model allows for 
quantitative experimentation that can reinforce or overturn his conclusions. 
 Entman’s study is composed of a series of case studies analyzing the struggle over 
framing during critical periods of high-profile foreign policy news coverage. In order to analyze 
how the media may have framed these events, Entman examines coverage from a sampling of 
sources - nightly news broadcasts on CBS or ABC, daily coverage in the New York Times and 
Washington Post, and weekly coverage in Time and the now-defunct Newsweek magazines 
(Entman, 2004). In the first major case study of the book, Entman points to research that CBS 
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news coverage can be “safely treated as broadly representative of ABC and NBC broadcast 
coverage,” and also notes that there is literature supporting the claims that the framing in these 
three networks’ coverage has been found to be similar enough to generally be treated as 
equivalent (Entman, 2004). Entman also justifies his selection of the Times and Post by calling 
them “perhaps the two most influential newspapers” (Entman, 2004). Most interestingly, Entman 
cites Time and Newsweek’s ability to peruse a week of other sources’ coverage prior to the print 
deadlines and distill it into a narrative generally reflecting the main themes in the media 
(Entman, 2004). These selections may have skewed his study’s findings given that the rise of 
ideologically-affiliated news on TV and online has significantly reduced the audience of “the 
traditional news media” since 1990 (Baum in Coglianese, 2012). Indeed, Entman notes that his 
findings are not necessarily generalizable to all mass media concerning the framing of the event 
he is studying. Despite these limitations, Entman’s sample of “premier” print and television 
media allows him to observe how exemplars of the news media treat different sources of  
framing within their stories, giving his theoretical conclusions greater significance than his 
findings regarding the specific framing of certain events in foreign policy news. Therefore, to 
replicate the strengths of Entman’s study, I have chosen to use the same print news sources for 
my case studies (excluding Newsweek for obvious reasons), as those data sources remained 
constant throughout his book and have the largest body of data to compare findings.  
 Though I chose to replicate Entman’s data collection methodology, I also chose to shift 
the period of data collection to reflect my focus on public diplomacy and policy outcomes rather 
than simply examining news coverage in and of itself. Since public opinion has the potential to 
impact policy decisions, opinion-shifting coverage relevant to intervention must be examined 
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during a period when the decision to intervene is actually being made. Unlike Entman, who tends 
to look at the media’s interpretations of critical events after they happened, I sought to observe 
how coverage of an unfolding crisis affects policy outcomes. Reflecting this research goal, I 
shifted my case study’s two-week-long “critical period” of news coverage to span the week 
before and the week after a significant foreign policy announcement. The policy announcement I 
have selected also satisfied the policy goals of international elites appealing to the American 
public, allowing for the study of how the press treated their public diplomacy efforts. In my 
analysis, I chose not to merely look at foreign criticism of the administration frame, but rather all 
comments and frames in the news put forth by foreign sources during this period. By analyzing 
the framing competition in a case that I am also able test in a controlled randomized survey 
experiment, I an observe how effective specific elites in the cascade are at influencing public 
opinion. Given that influence on the public’s understanding of an international crisis, one leader 
could potentially sway policy outcomes to a significant degree by convincing the public to 
support or oppose intervention. 
Case Study Selection 
 My use of a mixed-method analysis posed unique challenges for a study examining both 
competing frames and individual influence. For the qualitative study, which traces the media’s 
treatment of different elites’ frames throughout the data collection period, there had to be 
adequate disagreement about policy solutions to attribute distinct frames to the various elites 
opining on the matter. For the quantitative study, there had to be enough widespread agreement 
to control for potential differences in framing presented in the experimental stimuli and establish 
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that the independent variable is the identity of the elite communicating that frame. Moreover, the 
crises need to be high-profile and recent enough for the American public to know about them and 
have some opinion. In the past year, there has been one crisis that fits this description perfectly- 
the ISIS/ISIL crisis. 
 Elites throughout the cascade have agreed that the terrorist group ISIL is a threat and that 
something needs to be done to address them. However, there has also been significant 
disagreement as to how involved the US government should be in helping resolve the crises. By 
examining news coverage in the two weeks surrounding President Obama’s September 10, 2014 
announcement of an expanded airstrike campaign against ISIL in Syria and Iraq (September 
3-17), I was able to gauge how the press treats the frames put forth by the President, his 
supporters, and those who disagree with policies. Given the high profile of these crises, 
especially during the critical period which I have selected, I was also able to find experimental 
stimuli from elites throughout the cascade with frames that were similar enough to control for the 
public’s predisposition to favor one frame over another. 
Experimental Methodology 
 Given my study’s differences from Entman’s study, I believe that the quantitative 
methodology I propose adds robustness to his theoretical framework by providing an alternative 
method of measuring individual influence over public opinion. By establishing a clear causal 
relationship between communication and opinion shift, I was able to tease out the differences 
between the various communicators’ capabilities to influence public opinion. Overall, I believe 
revealing these relationships shines a light on the inner workings of Entman’s Cascading 
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Activation model both in the original environment in which he proposed it and in the realm of 
public diplomacy.  
 To establish measurable effects of various elites’ support for intervention on public 
opinion, I primed randomly sorted groups of respondents on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk with 
video clips of various leaders calling for some form of American action against ISIL. Mechanical 
Turk has been shown to be a source of robust data with strong internal validity that is often more 
representative than convenience samples often used by political science researchers (Buhrmester, 
Kwang, and Gosling, 2011 and Berisnky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012). With such a sound source of 
data, the main challenge in the quantitative experiment was the selection of the treatment videos. 
 The most critical variable that my experimental design had to control for was the content 
of the message in the treatment videos. When dealing with a hotly debated issue, widely varying 
frames might resonate differently amongst primed individuals, shifting public opinion due to the 
content of the message and obfuscating the influence of the communicator. Though it is nearly 
impossible for each elite’s message to be exactly the same when using videos for experimental 
stimuli, it is possible to get relatively close by choosing actors who agree on problem definition 
and policy solution. To achieve this level of control, I used videos of three different leaders 
across the cascade that were about 70 seconds long. The first treatment video was of President 
Obama calling for the passage of his proposed Authorized Use of Military Force bill (AUMF) to 
combat ISIL. The second was of Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid calling for passage of the 
President’s AUMF. The third treatment video was of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi 
advocating for aid from the international community (America implicitly being the main 
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contributor of that aid). The control group viewed an unrelated video selected to have no impact 
on opinion (an instructional video on tying bow ties).  5
 Following the priming instrument, I asked respondents a series of questions concerning 
their opinions on current and potential policy options to address the ISIL crisis. I then compared 
the results across the different groups in order to measure how opinion shifted due to the 
different treatments. Since it is unreasonable to expect the same amount of opinion shift due to 
priming an individual actor across every question in the survey instrument, I examined the 
comparative magnitudes of the shifts in reported opinion between treatment groups. In other 
words, I looked at who influenced opinion more or less, whether that influence reinforced or 
changed reported opinions, and whether those differences were statistically significant. This 
experimental design allowed me to best address the confounding factors in my experiment while 
still providing adequate priming stimuli to measure how priming with different leaders affected 
opinion. 
  
   
 Please refer to Appendix A for transcripts of the treatment videos.5
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Chapter 5: The Results 
Case Study Findings 
 The shift in the qualitative data collection period demonstrated a completely different role 
for foreign elites than the one described in Entman’s study. Once the White House started leaking 
the specifics of President Obama’s September 10th announcement, the media focused its 
coverage of the ISIL crisis on the roll-out of the expanded airstrike campaign, the effectiveness 
of the American coalition-building efforts, and the foreign and domestic reactions to the 
President’s policy shift. However, coverage prior to the policy announcement focused on the 
realities on the ground in Iraq and Syria. With the press trying to create a narrative about what 
ISIL was doing, how successful they were, and how war had affected local communities, NGOs 
and foreign elites from the region had significant power over the story that reached American 
readers. After the September 10th announcement, the role of international sources in news 
coverage expanded to include elites’ reactions to American coalition-building efforts across the 
world. Thus, foreign elites generally had distinct roles in the American media’s coverage that 
differed greatly from the roles of domestic sources, who often focused on the domestic policy 
debate. This finding actually contradicts Entman’s findings regarding the primary use of foreign 
sources, as foreign sources were used significantly by the press to support the White House 
frame. In fact, the amount of foreign-sourced information that supported the administration’s 
framing of events in Syria and Iraq was vastly greater than the total amount of foreign-sourced 
criticism. To break down what this comparison means in terms of real news coverage, let me 
define the frames I observed and outline how they were translated into coding. 
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The Obama Administration Frame 
 The White House’s framing of the ISIL crisis was encapsulated in President Obama’s 
September 10th speech where he committed to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIL. He 
presented ISIL as a brutal terrorist group that, having already publicly butchered two American 
journalists, would pose a serious threat to the United States if left to its own devices. Moreover, 
he highlighted ISIL’s persecution of minorities, women, and children to emphasize the 
humanitarian necessity of intervention. In order to assuage public fears of entering another 
quagmire in the Middle East, President Obama committed to forming an international coalition 
with partners around the world, including Arab nations, to pursue an expanded air campaign 
against ISIL and to provide aid to moderate Syrian rebels and the new Iraqi government. He also 
promised that there would be no American combat troops on the ground. Instead, the President 
compared this new military strategy to those that had been “successfully pursued in Yemen or 
Somalia for years.” According to President Obama, a more limited version of this strategy had 
already been successful in helping Kurdish and Iraqi troops save “the lives of thousands of 
innocent men, women, and children.” Ultimately, he called on Congress to support his efforts 
with legislation approving the aid and training of Syrian rebels. Though he did not need 
Congress’s authority to act, the President claimed, he believed “we are strongest as a nation 
when the president and Congress work together.” 
 The frame in this speech can be boiled down to a few key points. First, ISIL is a serious 
threat to human rights and international peace and security. Intervention is vital to dealing with 
this threat, and every expedient measure possible must be taken. Second, there must be strong 
cooperation between the US and the international community to combat ISIL. American troops 
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on the ground, for a number of reasons, is not an option. An active international coalition 
demonstrates that the world opposes this terrorist group, and it prevents the negative impact of an 
isolated American intervention. An American ground invasion would simply mobilize jihadist 
support around ISIL and undercut domestic public support for intervention. Third, American-led 
airstrikes have worked in the past and will be effective against ISIL going forward. Finally, the 
President does not need congressional approval to act. Though he called for Congress to act to 
show support, the unilateral actions the President announced were supposedly permitted through 
a previous AUMF allowing for the use of a certain amount of force without prior congressional 
approval. 
 When analyzing news coverage, I coded any information in articles attributed to 
foreigners or transnational organizations like the UN or Human Rights Watch (HRW) that 
reinforced the narrative presented by the Obama administration as “supportive.” This category 
included quotes from local tribal leaders about the need for American airstrikes and aid, reports 
from the UN and NGOs about human rights offenses committed by ISIL, and statements from 
foreign leaders about the serious security threats posed by ISIL. However, the “supportive” 
category of references also included statements from ISIL sympathizers which played into the 
Administration’s characterization of the terrorist group. For example, in a New York Times front 
page story covering ISIL sympathizers in Turkey, a young boy’s reaction to the beheading of 
American journalist James Foley was encapsulated in a hate-filled pronouncement: “Journalists, 
infidels of this country, we’ll kill them all.” Though this quote obviously communicates the boy’s 
opposition to American Middle East policy, it fits in nicely into the narrative that ISIL would 
pose a serious threat if left alone. Since the reporter clearly intended to use this quote to 
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demonstrate the ambitious and bloodthirsty nature of a growing terrorist group and its doctrine, I 
coded this foreign source as “supportive.”  
 Though the “supportive” coding scheme outlined above could also include the coverage 
of the execution videos published by ISIL itself, I chose not to code quotes or descriptions of the 
videos during data collection. Since I wanted to look at how third-party foreign and transnational 
sources’ framing impacted US policy against ISIL, I did not include the substantial coverage of 
the execution videos’ messages that would dilute the data regarding framing from other foreign 
sources.  
 Generally, I recorded a “reference” to a frame whenever the press quoted someone or 
reported something “according to” a source. Sources were divided into officials inside the 
Obama administration, domestic sources outside the executive branch, and foreign or 
transnational sources. To evaluate Entman’s claim about the role of foreign sources, I also sorted 
references from foreign or transnational sources into three categories evaluating the kind of 
frame offered. Not only could these sources support the White House frame, but they could also 
be coded for one of the two kinds of opposition to President Obama’s intervention policy. 
The Pro-Intervention Opposition Frame 
 Pro-interventionist opposition framing mostly focused on procedural criticism of 
President Obama’s leadership, but it also included some substantial criticism that the policy 
solutions the president offered as remedies did not go far enough. The procedural criticism 
covered by this frame, though usually originating from Congressional leaders and other domestic 
elites, generally hit at President Obama’s failure to act sooner to combat the ISIL threat. Though 
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pro-interventionist substantial criticism was somewhat less common, it endorsed a wide range of 
policy solutions that would constitute “doing more” to combat ISIL. Domestic pro-
interventionist frames ranged from criticizing the President’s refusal to consider the use of 
ground troops in Iraq to, as one Times op-ed called for, advocating a partnership with the Bashar 
al-Assad regime in Syria. Internationally, substantial pro-interventionist criticism of White 
House policy included everything from Syrian rebel leaders calling for military aid against 
Bashar al-Assad to an Assad spokesperson calling for the inclusion of the Syrian government in 
the US-led coalition coordinating airstrikes against ISIL. 
 Though both procedural and substantial criticisms raised concerns with the voracity and 
effectiveness of the President Obama’s proposed solutions, they endorsed the same problem 
definition and the same general policy solution as the White House. With both the President and 
his hawkish critics promoting intervention to the public, foreign policy doves could be pressured 
to side with the White House to ensure limits are placed on military action. Thus, if pro-
interventionist criticism is internalized in public opinion, its political capital will still largely 
support the President’s pro-intervention position despite his policy’s supposed failings. 
The Anti-Interventionist Opposition Frame 
 The anti-interventionist frames criticizing White House policy on ISIL are the building 
blocks of the “forces of disorder” from the Economist article referenced in the introduction. 
These frames touch upon the long history of what Entman calls the “quagmire” schema that has 
been prevalent in modern American politics since the Vietnam War. The quagmire schema 
presents foreign intervention as a mistake bound to escalate and evolve into a costly drawn-out 
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war without adequate congressional supervision. Within the category of critical frames that 
activate this anti-interventionist schema in the ISIL policy debate, there are also both procedural 
and substantial frames.  
 The anti-interventionist procedural criticism that was especially prevalent in the New 
York Times after the September 10th speech concerned President Obama’s constitutional 
authority to order military action unilaterally. Though these criticisms address substantial 
implications for the future of government and executive power, they are classified as procedural 
because they have nothing to do with the actual merits of intervening against ISIL. Anti-
interventionist procedural criticism still gives the President some leeway to act, as it only 
opposes the way intervention policy was enacted. Like the pro-interventionist critical frames, it 
still shares the same problem definition and endorses the same solution. Indeed, since his 
September 10th speech, President Obama has proposed a new AUMF to address this very kind 
criticism. However, he has also maintained his position regarding the legitimacy of the efforts 
previously outlined in his previous policy announcement. The simultaneous convenience and 
problem of unilateral executive action is that critics can only debate the constitutional legitimacy 
of a policy after it has already been implemented - yet another reason why it is important to study 
how the public understands international crises prior to announcements of White House policy. 
 The substantial criticisms that fell within the anti-interventionist quagmire schema 
focused on mission-creep and the costs of war. These frames often compared the new military 
intervention to the previous fiasco in Iraq under George W. Bush that cost the US billions of 
dollars and thousands of lives while creating the politically unstable situation that allowed for 
ISIL to rise to power. Substantial anti-interventionist frames also highlighted the potential for 
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significant civilian casualties and cast potential partners as war-weary and unwilling to act. Just 
as Human Rights Watch reports on ISIL’s butchering of innocents could implicitly advocate 
military action, NGO reports on civilian casualties from Iraqi military shelling could discourage 
a potentially flawed intervention on the side of a government that kills its own people. However, 
a less-intense version of the “quagmire” schema also undergirded the President’s reluctance to 
commit combat troops to the fight against ISIL. Many of the fears within this schema informed 
President Obama’s decision to impose limits on intervention and use his September 10th speech 
to reassure the public that it would “be different than the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.” 
 The other substantial criticism of the Obama administration frame is the assertion that the 
US should not bother committing money and lives to combat terrorists that do not pose an 
immediate threat to the US. Critics who use this frame point to the fact that intelligence officials 
have said that there has not been any “credible information” uncovered to suggest an imminent 
terrorist attack on American soil. This evidence is basically used to contest the notion that there 
is a problem at all. ISIL may be doing terrible things, critics concede, but they encourage the 
public to oppose intervention because these terrorists have no current plans to directly harm the 
United States. Needless to say, the vast majority of these critics who are advocating this frame 
are domestic elites. 
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Newspaper Coverage of the ISIL Crisis 
 Overall press coverage of the crisis in Iraq and Syria was overwhelmingly supportive of 
the narrative offered by the Obama administration.  Not only did the vast majority of the 6
coverage between news and editorials (70.2% of all related coverage) support the 
Administration’s frame, but critical coverage was further split up between the two different 
opposition frames. The two newspapers also tended to emphasize different kinds of critical 
frames in their respective coverage. Critical content in the Washington Post mainly focused on 
the pro-interventionist critical frames from domestic sources, which ranged from op-eds 
criticizing the administration’s lack of action, to hawkish criticism from Congressional 
Republicans about the President’s self-imposed limits on American involvement, to critical 
quotes that “derided” a presidential gaffe from a press conference. In the New York Times, anti-
interventionist frames were given more emphasis than in the Post’s coverage, publishing articles 
on the front with substantial criticism that reframed the ISIL threat using expert analysis. For 
example, the day after the president’s address announcing an expanded intervention effort, an 
article was published on the front page claiming that “some officials and terrorism experts 
believe that the actual danger posed by ISIS has been distorted in hours of television punditry 
and alarmist statements by politicians.”  
 However, despite some Times reporters’ front page efforts to reframe the ISIL crisis 
through an anti-interventionist lens, only about 27% of Times articles featured on the front page 
included serious criticism as article. The other 43% of Times articles featured on the front page 
that included critical frames used them to meet the media’s obligations to cover the political 
 To view a breakdown of the content analysis, please refer to Appendix B6
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situation of the policy being debated. This “political” motivation forced reporters to use 
opposition frames to balance coverage and help predict how Congress or the international 
community would act in response to White House framing and policy. Rather than fully debating 
the merits of one frame over another, the obligatory inclusion of multiple frames diluted the 
critical frames’ power by using them merely as a way to understand the policy debate and the 
context of the political horse race.  
 One example of the use of critical framing to characterize the political horse race and 
predict congressional action is from an article in the Times where a Republican lawmaker was 
quoted saying, “A lot of Democrats don’t know how it (ISIL intervention) would play in their 
party, and Republicans don’t want to change anything. We can denounce it if it goes bad and 
praise it if it goes well and ask him (President Obama) what took him so long” (parentheses 
added). Though there is substantial criticism underlying the reasons why Democrats “don’t know 
how it would play” and why “Republicans don’t want to change anything,” the emphasis on 
process distracts from the substantial arguments that motivate the political maneuvering 
highlighted in this quote. Furthermore, when characterizing the political situation, an article’s 
author can undercut the validity of a critical frame with quotes from other elites. For example, 
when some articles covered domestic criticism of President Obama’s “no strategy” against ISIL 
gaffe, some reporters either cited White House aides clarifying the president’s remarks or simply 
stated that critics were “misinterpreting” the comments. 
 Unlike Entman, who focuses on comparing substantial and procedural framing in front-
page articles, I sought to measure media treatment of critical frames in high-profile articles both 
substantial and procedural frames in the policy debate. As President Obama has recently turned 
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to Congress for approval of a new AUMF, procedural criticism has been shown to affect some 
changes in foreign policy. Thus, it is important to understand how seriously the press treat both 
kinds of frames. To address this need, I coded critical frames in articles featured on the front 
page as either contributing to the policy debate (“Policy”) or included to understand the political 
environment (“Politics”). With only 28% of articles featured on the front page containing serious 
contributions to the policy debate and two-thirds of all coverage in the data collection period 
supporting the administration frame, it is safe to conclude that the administration’s position was 
generally supported by the media. 
Quoting the Cascade and Media Use of Foreign Sources 
 Though the aggregate number of references to the administration, domestic elites, and 
foreign and transnational sources was roughly equal over the data collection period, the apparent 
equality of media attention falls apart upon closer examination. The first significant evidence of 
the media’s unequal treatment of sources lies in the frequency that the two different papers 
reference the different levels the cascade. The New York Times paid significantly more attention 
to foreign sources than the Washington Post, which more frequently turned to domestic experts 
and administration officials for input. One potential reason for this may lie in the identity of each 
newspaper. The Post is a paper that is published in a city where government is the main industry. 
Thus, understanding the inner workings of the White House and Congress is critical to many of 
its readers’ jobs, and the Post likely catered to those interests. Moreover, the dearth of think-
tanks in the city trying to maintain or improve their reputations allowed for reporters to 
frequently consult with a number of experts eager to share their opinions about any and every 
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issue. The Times, on the other hand, is known as the “newspaper of record.”  Thus their focus 7
may emphasize recording the events on the ground, promoting the use of foreign sources over 
domestic analysts who are “secondary sources.” 
 The data that are most telling about the roles of different elites in foreign policy news 
coverage, however, come from both papers’ use of sources in front page articles. Prior to the 
September 10th policy announcement, articles featured on the front page referenced “Foreign 
and Transnational” sources more than either other group, with 40.2% of references in featured 
articles in the sample period. These references largely characterized the realities of the ISIL crisis 
on the ground, but they also included reactions from foreign experts and government leaders 
concerning the geopolitical threat posed by ISIL or the latest barbaric murder committed by the 
terrorist group. Moreover, many of the domestic elites referenced in this period were former 
White House officials and Middle East or counterterrorism experts from think-tanks analyzing 
the crisis from afar. Once reporters found out about the upcoming White House policy 
announcement, there was a noticeable change in front page coverage. Reporters began outlining 
the administration’s positions, asking thought leaders for their analysis of the policy, and taking 
the temperature of members of Congress to gauge how much political support there would be for 
the President’s proposed policies. After President Obama announced the administration’s strategy 
for combatting ISIL, the press not only had to monitor the realities of the ISIL threat abroad, but 
they also had to cover the policy debate at home that spawned from the president’s speech. This 
shift in coverage priorities lead to a marked drop in the percentage of foreign sources referenced 
in both papers’ front page articles coupled with a rise in the percentage of domestic sources 
 See Encyclopædia Brittanica, “The New York Times,” http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/412546/The-7
New-York-Times
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referenced. With the policy debate especially critical to the lives of Washingtonians, references to 
foreign and transnational sources in articles featured on the front page of the Post dropped from 
29% to a mere 5.9% of references in front page articles during the data collection period. The 
drop in foreign or transnational references in the Times coverage was much less severe, dropping 
from 45.5% to 37.5% of references in articles featured on the front page, but the drop still 
reflected the need for the American media to cover the “domestic” policy debate. 
 With both the Times and the Post relying heavily on foreign and transnational sources to 
help define the conditions on the ground abroad, it becomes clear that these sources are critical to 
identifying the problems that inform the debate over foreign policy solutions. Sources ranging 
from local tribal leaders to major NGOs to the UN made it incredibly difficult for the “ISIL is not 
a direct threat” frame to gain traction by regularly highlighting ISIL’s vicious authoritarian rule, 
its human rights violations, and the threat posed by its widespread recruitment of fighters from 
western nations. With 83.4% of all foreign and transnational sources communicating some kind 
of pro-interventionist frame, ISIL was easily labeled as a serious and immediate threat to 
international peace and security (69.9% reinforced the White House’s narrative and 13.5% called 
for even greater intervention). The strong international support for the Obama administration’s 
problem definition was also reflected in a Post-ABC poll that was first reported in the September 
9th Post and later mentioned in the September 12th Times. The survey of a random sample of 
1,001 adults revealed that “nine in 10 Americans now see the militants as a serious threat to vital 
U.S. interests” and that 71% of the American public favors airstrikes. As the poll was conducted 
prior to the president’s September 10th speech announcing the expansion of airstrikes in Iraq and 
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Syria, it is clear that the political capital had already been mobilized behind military intervention 
before the domestic policy debate truly began. 
The Disappointing Case of Time Magazine 
 The lack of data from my chosen data collection period in Time was surprising. When I 
finally came across the double issue magazine that covered both weeks of the period I had 
selected for analysis, not only was the ISIL crisis not even mentioned on the magazine cover, but 
I also discovered that there was barely any hard news in the issue at all. It was the “Answers 
Issue,” which spent a significant portion of the issue answering random questions of varying 
importance with slick graphics and short blurbs. Instead of covering the issues of the day, it spent 
many pages answering life’s most important questions, such as “Where is the richest suburb in 
America?” and “When will we discover aliens?” Needless to say, this magazine made me rather 
discouraged about the current state of the print media. 
 Time had only 2 relevant articles and one short quote from Senator Rand Paul on the 
“Briefing” page. Senator Paul’s quote was a politically-focused use of the quagmire frame, 
claiming that Hillary Clinton would get the US “involved in another Middle Eastern War” if 
elected president. The caption that gave the quote context further reinforced the horse-race 
treatment, saying that Senator Paul was talking about “how his non-interventionist stance could 
attract Democratic votes in 2016.”  
 The two articles, however, reflected the focus of the press on policy debate once the 
White House announced its policy. There was a short column in the world news section on the 
burgeoning civil war in Libya where regional powers had started calling in air strikes against 
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Islamist militants for “fear for their own stability” due to the rise of ISIL. The second article was 
more substantial, dedicating two pages to the “bitter debate over a new war in the Middle East” 
and procedural criticism about President Obama’s unilateral expansion of airstrikes. There were 
no foreign or transnational sources referenced in the article, as the main focus of the article was 
the supposed constitutional implications of the President’s actions without congressional 
approval.  
 Given the lack of data, no serious conclusions can be drawn without a more robust 
sample of magazine data. But since Time reviewed two weeks of news prior to printing this 
double-issue, the magazine’s choice to encapsulate two weeks of civil war in Iraq and Syria and 
a major American foreign policy shift in one article focusing on constitutional process is telling. 
The choice of this one article as the “core” of two weeks of news coverage suggests that the post-
announcement findings from my examination of the Post and the Times may hold true in the 
weekly print media as well. Further research using a weekly magazine with better hard news 
coverage is necessary. 
The Quantitative Experiment 
 The survey I fielded on Mechanical Turk provided robust data for statistical analysis. 
Since this controlled randomized survey experiment relies on internal validity, the skewed 
demographics of the sample population were not really an issue until I attempted to look at 
responses by ideology and education level, where some groups were too small for sound 
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analysis.  That being said, the survey data revealed some compelling insights into how the public 8
internalized the frames presented to them by different elites in the experimental stimuli. 
 On an aggregate level, priming respondents with different videos was shown to have a 
highly statistically significant relationship to the opinions reported on every question asked in the 
survey (p<.01). These highly significant relationships between treatment and question response 
indicate that the different elites influenced public opinion in noticeably different ways. However, 
not every question was affected in the same way.  
 All three experimental treatments demonstrated significant agenda setting affects, with an 
increase of anywhere from 7.9 to 14.9 percentage points in the number of respondents selecting 
foreign policy over environment, healthcare and civil rights as the most important issue of the 
options presented. Interestingly, the percentage of respondents selecting civil rights as most 
important fell in all three treatment groups as well, losing between 3.5 points and 5.9 points. In 
both opinion shifts, the presidential priming instrument was the most effective treatment.  
 The President was also the most effective at shifting opinion in favor of his handling of 
the ISIL. A majority of respondents (52%) who watched the Obama priming instrument reported 
that his handling of ISIL was “about right” when asked whether they believed that he was being 
“too tough, about right, or not tough enough in dealing with ISIS/ISIL,” a 14 point increase from 
the control group. Moreover, those who were primed with the Obama treatment were the least 
likely to select the most anti-interventionist option, “The US should not get too involved in the 
situation,” with 19.1% of respondents viewing the treatment choosing that option in comparison 
to 23.1% in the control group. In agenda setting, both Senator Reid and Prime Minister al-Abadi 
 For a demographic profile of this study and the rest of the survey data, please turn to Appendix C8
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seemed to be almost equally effective in raising the foreign affairs response, but the group that 
viewed the al-Abadi treatment were slightly more likely to believe that President Obama was 
“about right” in his handling of ISIL. Though the president seemed to be the most effective in 
raising the profile of foreign policy issues and rallying support for his endorsed policy solution, 
he was not the most effective in shifting opinion on every question. 
 Responses regarding President Obama’s job approval and his overall handling of 
international crises were a little more convoluted. Though all three treatment groups experienced 
a drop in respondents reporting that they had no confidence in the president’s handling of 
international crises, both the Reid and Obama treatment groups reported similar increases in the 
number of responses choosing “some” confidence. Though the al-Abadi treatment group had a 
slightly higher response rate of “none” and a smaller percentage of “some” responses in 
comparison to the other treatment groups, this group also reported the lowest percentage of 
“little” and the highest percentage of “a lot” responses for the same question. In the Reid 
treatment group, the percentage of respondents reporting “a lot” of confidence actually fell over 
2 percentage points in comparison to the control group. The shifts in opinion concerning overall 
job approval are similarly convoluted, but it is important to note that all three treatment groups 
reported some sort of increase in both the percentage of respondents who said that they 
“approved” of the overall job that Barack Obama was doing as President and the percentage of 
respondents who said they had “some confidence” in him to handle an international crisis. 
 The treatments’ effects on the three questions concerning the details of President 
Obama’s intervention policy may demonstrate where foreign leaders can wield significant 
influence over American public opinion. When asked whether they favor or oppose sending 
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ground troops into combat operations against ISIL, all three treatment groups saw a rise in the 
percentage of  “no opinion” answers coupled with a drop in respondents favoring the use of 
ground troops. However, the al-Abadi treatment group was the only group that saw a higher 
percentage of respondents answer that they opposed sending ground troops (which was actually a 
majority at 51.9%) than the control group. In contrast, the percentage of respondents who 
opposed sending ground troops fell in the Reid treatment group and even more drastically in the 
Obama treatment group. Moreover, though a vast majority of respondents across every group 
already believed that the President was right in asking for a new AUMF, the largest rise in 
support for the request was in the al-Abadi treatment group. Over 85% of this treatment group 
reported that the president was right to ask for a new AUMF, and it was also the only treatment 
group to see a rise, albeit only a small one, in support for the passage of that bill.  
 This distinct shift may have occurred in part due to a quote in the al-Abadi treatment 
video in which the Iraqi prime minister calls for much-needed international aid and reports that 
the “onslaught of Daesh… is being reversed” (See Appendix A). Though I originally expected 
domestic elites to have a greater influence over public opinion, the data indicate that a foreign 
leader may have greater influence over the specifics of policy decisions that specifically pertain 
to the country which they are from. Since the Prime Minister of Iraq confirmed that air strikes 
and aid had been effective in turning the tide against ISIL within his country, respondents may 
have felt more comfortable supporting the White House’s proposed aid and limitations on 
military force. With the terrorists on the back foot, US ground troops may have simply seemed 
unnecessary, and aid from the international community endorsed by al-Abadi may have been 
seen as the reasonable solution.  
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Addressing the Effects By Demographic 
 When the time came to analyze the data to address the sub-hypotheses based on schemas 
and demographics, there were some issues regarding the sample size of less educated 
respondents. None of my attempts to examine differences in primed opinions through the lens of 
respondents’ level of education were found to be statistically significant, as there seemed to be 
simply too few respondents at each level to uncover meaningful relationships across treatment 
groups. In order to view the effects of one’s education level on their shifts in opinion when 
primed, I believe that a simpler questionnaire or a larger sample size with a wider range of 
educational experiences may have helped. 
 With regards to ideology, there were a number of interesting findings, including which 
ideological groups did not show statistically significant differences between treatments at all. 
Respondents who self-identified as “somewhat liberal” or “very liberal” did not have any 
statistically significant differences in opinion by treatment. Furthermore, respondents who 
identified as Democrats did not have any statistically significant differences in opinion by 
treatment either.  
 The only ideological groups that had any sort of statistically significant relationship to 
how they processed the different priming instruments were “somewhat conservatives” and 
“independents” (there were not enough respondents who self-identified as “very conservative” to 
uncover any meaningful findings). When respondents self-identified as ideologically 
independent, the data show statistically significant relationships (p<.05) between the priming 
instrument and respondents’ opinions on agenda setting, overall job approval, and the president’s 
handling of ISIL. The data also reveal a statistically significant relationship between the priming 
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instrument and agenda-setting amongst self-identified conservatives. With ideological 
independents and conservatives demonstrating similar statistical relationships, it was 
unsurprising to see respondents who identified as Independents or affiliated themselves with the 
Republican Party demonstrated statistically significant relationships between their priming 
instruments and responses on the same question (p<.05). Yet the agenda-setting question was the 
only one that exhibited a distinct relationship between party affiliation of any kind, treatment 
group, and reported opinion. 
 Since these statistically significant relationships between ideology, treatment group, and 
opinion are not ubiquitous throughout the survey, I hesitate to draw specific conclusions on how 
ideological schemas affect the ways respondents process frames from different elites. That being 
said, the presence of some statistically significant relationships between ideology, treatment 
group, and opinion indicate that schemas like ideology may influence how individuals process 
communication from different elites. Since I attempted to hold the frame constant while varying 
the individual communicating that frame, the data indicate that both the partisan (i.e. liberal or 
conservative, Republican or Democrat) and the personal (i.e. Prime Minister of Iraq or President 
of the United States) identities of the individual communicating a frame may help determine the 
fate of their attempt to win the framing contest. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Identity and Influence 
 Both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of this study have demonstrated the 
importance of identity in the framing contest. Before the domestic framing debate over policy 
solutions began in earnest, foreign elites and transnational organizations made significant high-
profile contributions to defining ISIL as a serious threat that required some level of intervention. 
By basically monopolizing the framing of problem definition, these international sources limited 
the range of acceptable policy solutions before most domestic elites could offer their own 
framing of events. As polls overwhelmingly demonstrated, a vast majority of Americans not only 
agreed with the problem definition that most foreign sources promoted, but they also agreed with 
the basic strategy of the policy solution that the Obama Administration would endorse just days 
later. With the President at the top of the media coverage cascade, the White House essentially 
won the struggle for framing dominance as soon as President Obama announced a position that 
was in line with foreign and transnational elites’ problem definition. Due to this early influence 
on foreign policy problem definition, I believe that foreign leaders, NGOs, and transnational 
organizations should be given a place in the Cascading Activation model above domestic elites 
and below the White House. 
 Just as the identities of different sources affected how the media utilized them when 
crafting narratives, the identities of different leaders made significant differences in how primed 
individuals factored frames into their opinions. A foreign leader’s influence on public opinion 
could, in certain cases, be greater than the influence of both a domestic elite and the President. 
Indicative of this potential influence, the al-Abadi treatment video was the most effective at 
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increasing support for the specifics of the current White House strategy against ISIL. The Iraqi 
prime minister report that ISIL’s brutal advance was being reversed may have had greater 
legitimacy than any reassurance from a domestic leader. President Obama, however, seemed to 
be more effective at raising the profile of the issue through agenda-setting, and he was also more 
effective at shifting opinion to support his leadership specifically regarding the handling ISIL. 
Harry Reid was somewhere in the middle, demonstrating that my hypotheses comparing foreign 
and domestic elites on this issue was incorrect. Despite being brand-new to the world of 
international politics, Haider al-Abadi’s public diplomacy efforts could be seen as better at 
influencing certain aspects of public opinion than Harry Reid’s attempts to influence the framing 
competition. 
 The way that the general public understands each elite’s identity may also be affected by 
each individual’s own unique set of schemas. These schemas may include the use of ideological 
affiliation and political party to characterize an elite, which may then alter how an individual 
understands the framing choices made by that elite. For example, a person who self-identifies as 
a serious conservative may categorically deny any foreign policy a progressive president may 
propose simply due to the nature of that president’s politics (though there was not enough data to 
examine this hypothetical). However, further research is necessary to establish this link. 
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“Identity Politics” and Public Diplomacy 
 Since understanding identity is critical to understanding how the press covers a specific 
elite and how the public internalizes that elite’s framing of events, there are a number of 
significant, practical, and positive applications of this research to public diplomacy under the 
Nonstate Transnational model. The three suggestions outlined below are useful not only in the 
field of public diplomacy, but also potentially useful for any area where public opinion exerts 
significant influence. 
 The first practical application of this research involves problem definition in press 
coverage. As foreign elites and transnational organizations are relied upon significantly by the 
press to define the nature of international crises, public diplomacy efforts must naturally begin 
with problem definition. As the process of problem definition often occurs before the White 
House actively pursues any kind of solution, foreign leaders and NGO members seeking can 
shape the range of acceptable policy solutions in an international crisis by defining the problem 
appropriately in the media before any other group has a chance to define it. In a sense, foreign 
leaders and transnational organizations can pre-empt the White House in the cascade, though the 
administration’s frame will likely still get preferential treatment in the media. One op-ed in the 
New York Times acknowledged the particular power of problem definition when the author wrote 
that the “ISIS narrative is so vicious and so brutal that it (ISIS) has virtually no external 
allies” (parenthesis and emphasis added). Those who were able to win the framing contest and 
define ISIL as a serious and brutal problem helped prevent the terrorist group from making any 
powerful new friends. 
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 This activist use of problem definition in public diplomacy factors in both the particular 
powers and limitations of political communications. Though the media may rely on elite opinion 
for content, there are specific ways that the media choose to use elite opinion to craft their own 
narratives. This partnership in forming news content means that the foreign nations and 
transnational actors who engage in public diplomacy are uniquely situated to help craft the 
narratives relevant to their own specific issues. These actors can be the first people in the cascade 
to quickly identify a problem and publicize it, but it may be incredibly difficult to dislodge a 
certain problem definition once serious debate about solutions to the wrong problem begins. 
 The second way that this research can be applied is a more tangible operationalization of 
the use of quantitative methodology to understand political identity and influence. Just as 
domestic politicians run polls to test how to best market their previous work and leadership 
experience, leaders in foreign governments or transnational organizations could field 
experiments to help understand how the public understands their identity, how they can most 
effectively influence opinion towards their desired policy outcomes, and how potential 
surrogates could do a better job of influencing opinion on certain issues. If this research can be 
expanded to nations beyond the United States, it could potentially have serious diplomatic 
implications. Imagine using polling and experimentation to establish a list of international 
leaders who Israelis and Palestinians mutually hold in the highest regard. Mobilizing a public 
diplomacy campaign utilizing these true opinion makers could have a significant impact on the 
effort to reach a two-state solution. Survey research like this can help distinguish exactly which 
elites one might want to utilize as surrogates in public diplomacy, and I believe it can do so both 
effectively and economically. 
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 Finally, understanding how identity factors into public diplomacy and the outcomes of 
the foreign policy framing contest is critical to good democratic leadership. As public diplomacy 
often involves debate over policies that can quite literally save the lives of thousands, if not 
millions, of people, democratically-elected leaders of needy, unstable nations are regularly 
involved in public diplomacy efforts. Thus, understanding the merits of one’s own position in the 
cascade of influence is one way to address the question of how to be a good democratic leader in 
foreign policy posed by Elizabeth Saunders in Kane and Patapan’s aptly titled Good Democratic 
Leadership (2014). Though Saunders incorrectly posits that public opinion has little effect over 
foreign policy, she offers a compelling puzzle for democratic leadership when she asks, “How 
can leaders be empowered to choose good policies that protect the state’s interests, 
simultaneously remaining true to democratic principles and operating without undue constraints 
from electoral or other short-term political concerns?” (Saunders in Kane and Patapan, 2014).  
By understanding one’s own ability to influence both foreign and domestic public opinion and 
using that knowledge to mobilize opinion, democratic leaders can maximize their capacity to 
influence policy outcomes within the constraints of a democratic system. Instead of being limited 
by the “undue constraints of electoral or other short-term political concerns,” they are 
empowered by them. 
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Appendix A: Treatment Video Scripts 
Treatment 1: Barack Obama  
 “Now make no mistake this is a difficult mission. And it will remain difficult for some 
time. But our coalition is on the offensive, ISIL is on the defensive, and ISIL is going to lose. 
With vile groups like this there is only one option. With our allies and partners, we are going to 
degrade and ultimately destroy this terrorist group. When I announced our strategy against ISIL 
in September, I said that we are strongest as a nation when the president and Congress work 
together. Today, my administration submitted a draft resolution to Congress to authorize the use 
of force against ISIL. This resolution reflects our core objective to destroy ISIL. It supports the 
comprehensive strategy that we have been pursuing with our allies and our partners: a systemic 
and sustained campaign of airstrikes against ISIL and Iraq and Syria. Support and training for 
local forces on the ground, including the moderate Syrian opposition. Preventing ISIL attacks in 
the region and beyond, including by foreign terrorist fighters who try to threaten our countries. 
Regional and international support for an inclusive Iraqi government that unites the Iraqi people 
and strengthens Iraqi forces against ISIL.” 
Treatment 2: Harry Reid 
 “Last night President Obama outlined a strategy for eradicating ISIS without repeating 
the mistakes of the past. President made it clear that we will not rush into another ground war in 
the Middle East and we will not go at it alone. Instead America will lead a coalition that includes 
European and Arab nations in a targeted, strategic mission to destroy ISIS. American airstrikes 
will be supported by local forces fighting on the ground to protect their own countries, their own 
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families, their own homes, their own communities. But now it is up to Congress to rally behind 
President Obama and his decisive strategy. The proposal that the President has given to the 
American people requires immediate congressional action in granting the administration the 
authority to equip and train Syrian rebels under Title 10 to fight ISIS. Now is the time for us to 
come together to speak with one voice and tell the terrorists: you cannot hide, you’ve committed 
horrific accidents, threatened the security of the United States and our allies, and we will find 
you and we will destroy you.” 
Treatment 3: Haider al-Abadi 
 “Yes I think so. I think the reverses of Daesh or the onslaught of Daesh has been 
reversed. Not fully but is being reversed, is in the opposite direction now, that is very important. 
I think we have made a change in the political atmosphere, in the social atmosphere of the 
country. I have to be very blunt about this. We need the support. The support is essential. The 
fact that the whole world is standing with us is very important for our own public, for our own 
soldiers. We are the only country who have soldiers on the ground who are fighting Daesh and is 
important to the moral support of our soldiers. There has been an increase of this bombing of 
Daesh locations. There has been a very well liaison and coordination between our ground forces 
and the air cover which is provided for our own forces. I think now that this cooperation is very 
good. So for this war to continue and we have to continue this war, we need a lot of support from 
the international community. I mean one of the reasons I am here is to gather this support from 
the international coalition to support Iraq, to keep its fight and to keep its people. The minimum 
services must be there.” 
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Appendix B- Press Coverage Content Analysis 
Overall Press Coverage 
Washington Post Coverage
Type of Article Data Collection Period Number of Articles Percentage of Articles
Supportive News Before 9/10 35 26.9%
After 9/10 29 22.3%
Total 64 49.2%
Supportive Editorials Before 9/10 10 7.7%
After 9/10 15 11.5%
Total 25 19.2%
Critical News Before 9/10 5 3.8%
After 9/10 12 9.2%
Total 17 13.1%
Critical Editorials Before 9/10 14 10.8%
After 9/10 10 7.7%
Total 24 18.5%
New York Times Coverage
Type of Article Data Collection Period Number of Articles Percentage of Articles
Supportive News Before 9/10 34 30.35%
After 9/10 34 30.35%
Total 68 60.7%
Supportive Editorials Before 9/10 9 8%
After 9/10 4 3.6%
Total 13 11.6%
Critical News Before 9/10 7 6.3%
After 9/10 11 9.8%
Total 18 16.1%
Critical Editorials Before 9/10 3 2.7%
After 9/10 10 8.9%
Total 13 11.6%
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Aggregate Newspaper Coverage
Type of Article Data Collection Period Number of Articles Percentage of Articles
Supportive News Before 9/10 69 28.5%
After 9/10 63 26%
Total 132 54.5%
Supportive Editorials Before 9/10 19 7.85%
After 9/10 19 7.85%
Total 38 15.7%
Critical News Before 9/10 12 5%
After 9/10 23 9.5%
Total 35 14.5%
Critical Editorials Before 9/10 17 7%
After 9/10 20 8.3%
Total 37 15.3%
Framing of Washington Post Coverage
Main Frame of Article Data Collection Period Number of Articles Percentage of Articles
Policy Positive Before 9/10 45 34.6%
After 9/10 39 30%
Total 84 64.6%
Policy Negative Before 9/10 13 10%
After 9/10 16 12.3%
Total 29 22.3%
Leadership Positive Before 9/10 1 0.8%
After 9/10 4 3.1%
Total 5 3.9%
Leadership Negative Before 9/10 6 4.6%
After 9/10 6 4.6%
Total 12 9.2%
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Framing of New York Times Coverage
Main Frame of Article Data Collection Period Number of Articles Percentage of Articles
Policy Positive Before 9/10 42 37.5%
After 9/10 35 31.25%
Total 77 68.75%
Policy Negative Before 9/10 5 4.5%
After 9/10 16 14.25%
Total 21 18.75%
Leadership Positive Before 9/10 1 0.9%
After 9/10 4 3.6%
Total 5 4.5%
Leadership Negative Before 9/10 5 4.5%
After 9/10 4 3.5%
Total 9 8%
Aggregate Newspaper Framing
Main Frame of Article Data Collection Period Number of Articles Percentage of Articles
Policy Positive Before 9/10 87 36%
After 9/10 74 30.5%
Total 161 66.6%
Policy Negative Before 9/10 18 7.4%
After 9/10 32 13.2%
Total 50 20.7%
Leadership Positive Before 9/10 2 0.8%
After 9/10 8 3.3%
Total 10 4.1%
Leadership Negative Before 9/10 11 4.5%
After 9/10 10 4.1%
Total 21 8.6%
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Washington Post Treatment of Criticism in Featured Articles
Press Treatment Number of Articles Percentage of Articles
Policy 6 30%
Politics 12 60%
Total 20
New York Times Treatment of Criticism in Featured Articles
Press Treatment Number of Articles Percentage of Articles
Policy 8 26.7%
Politics 13 43.3%
Total 30
Aggregate Treatment of Criticism in Featured Articles
Press Treatment Number of Articles Percentage of Articles
Policy 14 28%
Politics 25 50%
Total 50
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Frame Sources in Press Coverage 
Washington Post Frame Sources by Sample Period
Collection Period Frame Sources Number of 
References
Percentage 
within Sample 
Period
Percentage of 
Total References
September 3-10 Administration 111 48.3% 15.7%
Domestic 63 27.4% 8.9%
Foreign and 
Transnational
56 24.3% 7.9%
Total 230 32.5%
September 11-17 Administration 166 34.7% 23.4%
Domestic Elites 193 40.4% 27.3%
Foreign and 
Transnational
119 24.9% 16.8%
Total 478 67.5%
New York Times Frame Sources by Sample Period
Collection Period Frame Sources Number of 
References
Percentage 
within Sample 
Period
Percentage of 
Total References
September 3-10 Administration 117 31.8% 12.6%
Domestic 120 32.6% 12.9%
Foreign and 
Transnational
131 35.6% 14.1%
Total 368 39.6%
September 11-17 Administration 206 36.6% 22.2%
Domestic Elites 174 31% 18.7%
Foreign and 
Transnational
182 32.4% 19.5%
Total 562 60.4%
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Aggegate Frame Sources by Sample Period
Collection Period Frame Sources Number of 
References
Percentage 
within Sample 
Period
Percentage of 
Total References
September 3-10 Administration 228 38.2% 13.9%
Domestic 183 30.65% 11.2%
Foreign and 
Transnational
186 31.15% 11.4%
Total 597 36.5%
September 11-17 Administration 372 35.8% 22.7%
Domestic Elites 367 35.3% 22.4%
Foreign and 
Transnational
301 28.9% 18.4%
Total 1,040 63.5%
Washington Post Frame Sources in Featured Articles
Collection Period Frame Sources Number of 
References
Percentage 
within Sample 
Period
Percentage of 
Total References
September 3-10 Administration 14 22.6% 7.7%
Domestic 30 48.4% 16.7%
Foreign and 
Transnational
18 29% 10%
Total 62 34.4%
September 11-17 Administration 63 53.4% 35%
Domestic 48 40.7% 26.7%
Foreign and 
Transnational
7 5.9% 3.9%
Total 118 65.6%
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New York Times Frame Sources in Featured Articles
Collection Period Frame Sources Number of 
References
Percentage 
within Sample 
Period
Percentage of 
Total References
September 3-10 Administration 35 26.5% 8.9%
Domestic 37 28% 9.4%
Foreign and 
Transnational
60 45.5% 15.2%
Total 132 33.6%
September 11-17 Administration 82 31.4% 20.9%
Domestic 81 31% 20.6%
Foreign and 
Transnational
98 37.5% 24.9%
Total 261 66.4%
Aggregate Frame Sources in Featured Articles
Collection Period Frame Sources Number of 
References
Percentage 
within Sample 
Period
Percentage of 
Total References
September 3-10 Administration 49 25.3% 8.6%
Domestic 67 32.5% 11.7%
Foreign and 
Transnational
78 40.2% 13.6%
Total 194 33.9%
September 11-17 Administration 145 38.3% 25.3%
Domestic 129 34% 22.5%
Foreign and 
Transnational
105 27.7% 18.3%
Total 379 66.1%
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Framing from Foreign and Transnational Sources 
Washington Post Frames from Foreign and Transnational Sources
Number of References Percentage of References
Support Administration 132 75.4%
Pro-Intervention Critical 26 14.9%
Anti-intervention Critical 17 9.7%
Total 175
New York Times Frames from Foreign and Transnational Sources
Number of References Percentage of References
Support Administration 209 66.8%
Pro-Intervention Critical 40 12.8%
Anti-intervention Critical 64 20.4%
Total 313
Aggregate Frames from Foreign and Transnational Sources
Number of References Percentage of References
Support Administration 341 69.9%
Pro-Intervention Critical 66 13.5%
Anti-intervention Critical 81 16.6%
Total 488
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Appendix C: Quantitative Experiment Data 
Demographics: 
Are you:
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Male 582 62.2 62.6 62.6
Female 348 37.2 37.4 100.0
Total 930 99.5 100.0
Missing System 5 .5
Total 935 100.0
Are you:
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Male 582 62.2 62.6 62.6
Female 348 37.2 37.4 100.0
Total 930 99.5 100.0
Missing System 5 .5
Total 935 100.0
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Are you of Hispanic or Latino origin or descent?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes 73 7.8 7.8 7.8
No 858 91.8 92.2 100.0
Total 931 99.6 100.0
Missing System 4 .4
Total 935 100.0
What is the last grade of school you completed?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Valid No high school diploma 9 1.0 1.0 1.0
High school graduate 105 11.2 11.3 12.2
Some college/associate 
degree
336 35.9 36.1 48.3
College graduate 379 40.5 40.7 88.9
Postgraduate study 103 11.0 11.1 100.0
Total 932 99.7 100.0
Missing System 3 .3
Total 935 100.0
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What is your age?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Valid 18-24 195 20.9 20.9 20.9
25-29 254 27.2 27.3 48.2
30-39 257 27.5 27.6 75.8
40-44 69 7.4 7.4 83.2
45-49 43 4.6 4.6 87.8
50-59 75 8.0 8.0 95.8
60-64 23 2.5 2.5 98.3
65 and older 16 1.7 1.7 100.0
Total 932 99.7 100.0
Missing System 3 .3
Total 935 100.0
Are you registered to vote?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes 809 86.5 87.2 87.2
No 119 12.7 12.8 100.0
Total 928 99.3 100.0
Missing System 7 .7
Total 935 100.0
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Thinking about your general approach to issues, do you consider yourself to be liberal, 
moderate, or conservative?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Valid Very liberal 179 19.1 19.2 19.2
Somewhat liberal 339 36.3 36.5 55.7
Moderate 230 24.6 24.7 80.4
Somewhat conservative 141 15.1 15.2 95.6
Very conservative 41 4.4 4.4 100.0
Total 930 99.5 100.0
Missing System 5 .5
Total 935 100.0
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as:
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Valid Democrat 418 44.7 44.8 44.8
Republican 146 15.6 15.6 60.5
Independent 317 33.9 34.0 94.4
Something else 52 5.6 5.6 100.0
Total 933 99.8 100.0
Missing System 2 .2
Total 935 100.0
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Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong Democrat?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Valid Strong Democrat 189 20.2 45.2 45.2
Not very strong Democrat 229 24.5 54.8 100.0
Total 418 44.7 100.0
Missing System 517 55.3
Total 935 100.0
Would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong Republican?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Valid Strong Republican 45 4.8 31.0 31.0
Not very strong Republican
100 10.7 69.0 100.0
Total 145 15.5 100.0
Missing System 790 84.5
Total 935 100.0
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party, closer to the Democratic Party, or do you think 
of yourself as strictly Independent?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Valid Republican Party 51 5.5 16.1 16.1
Democratic Party 119 12.7 37.7 53.8
Strictly Independent 146 15.6 46.2 100.0
Total 316 33.8 100.0
Missing System 619 66.2
Total 935 100.0
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Last year, what was the total income before taxes of all the people in your household or 
apartment?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Valid Under $30,000
292 31.2 31.3 31.3
$30,000 to $49,999 226 24.2 24.2 55.5
$50,000 to $99,999 330 35.3 35.4 90.9
$100,000 to $199,999 79 8.4 8.5 99.4
$200,000 to $249,999 3 .3 .3 99.7
$250,000 or more 3 .3 .3 100.0
Total
933 99.8 100.0
Missing System
2 .2
Total
935 100.0
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Issue Rank By Treatment 
Trtmt * IssueRank Crosstabulation
IssueRank
Total0 1 2 3 4
Trtmt 0 Count 2 0 0 0 0 2
% within Trtmt 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1 Count 0 40 122 58 26 246
% within Trtmt 0.0% 16.3% 49.6% 23.6% 10.6% 100.0%
2 Count 0 33 101 76 27 237
% within Trtmt 0.0% 13.9% 42.6% 32.1% 11.4% 100.0%
3 Count 0 40 89 52 27 208
% within Trtmt 0.0% 19.2% 42.8% 25.0% 13.0% 100.0%
4 Count 0 44 84 74 40 242
% within Trtmt 0.0% 18.2% 34.7% 30.6% 16.5% 100.0%
Total Count 2 157 396 260 120 935
% within Trtmt 0.2% 16.8% 42.4% 27.8% 12.8% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 951.941a 16 .000
Likelihood Ratio 45.495 16 .000
N of Valid Cases 935
a. 9 cells (36.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is .00.
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Treatment: 
1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control 
Responses: 
0- No Response; 1- Environment; 2- Foreign Affairs;          
3- Healthcare; 4-Civil Rights 
Favor Sending Ground Troops by Treatment 
Trtmt * Q38 Crosstabulation
Q38
Total0 1 2 3
Trtmt 0 Count 2 0 0 0 2
% within Trtmt 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1 Count 0 91 110 45 246
% within Trtmt 0.0% 37.0% 44.7% 18.3% 100.0%
2 Count 0 90 109 38 237
% within Trtmt 0.0% 38.0% 46.0% 16.0% 100.0%
3 Count 0 65 108 35 208
% within Trtmt 0.0% 31.3% 51.9% 16.8% 100.0%
4 Count 1 97 116 28 242
% within Trtmt 0.4% 40.1% 47.9% 11.6% 100.0%
Total Count 3 343 443 146 935
% within Trtmt 0.3% 36.7% 47.4% 15.6% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 631.439a 12 .000
Likelihood Ratio 35.519 12 .000
N of Valid Cases 935
a. 8 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is .01.
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Treatment: 
1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control 
Responses: 
0- No Response; 1- Favor; 2- Oppose; 3- No Opinion 
Confidence In Barack Obama’s Handling of International Crises by Treatment 
Trtmt * ObamaConf Crosstabulation
ObamaConf
Total0 1 2 3 4
Trtmt 0 Count 2 0 0 0 0 2
% within Trtmt 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1 Count 0 50 116 50 30 246
% within Trtmt 0.0% 20.3% 47.2% 20.3% 12.2% 100.0%
2 Count 0 43 113 54 27 237
% within Trtmt 0.0% 18.1% 47.7% 22.8% 11.4% 100.0%
3 Count 0 52 88 39 29 208
% within Trtmt 0.0% 25.0% 42.3% 18.8% 13.9% 100.0%
4 Count 0 50 100 45 47 242
% within Trtmt 0.0% 20.7% 41.3% 18.6% 19.4% 100.0%
Total Count 2 195 417 188 133 935
% within Trtmt 0.2% 20.9% 44.6% 20.1% 14.2% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 947.246a 16 .000
Likelihood Ratio 40.404 16 .001
N of Valid Cases 935
a. 9 cells (36.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is .00.
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Treatment: 
1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control 
Responses: 
0- No Response; 1- A Lot; 2- Some; 3- Little; 4- None 
Approval of Barack Obama’s Job as President by Treatment 
Trtmt * ObamaJob Crosstabulation
ObamaJob
Total0 1 2 3 4 5
Trtmt 0 Count 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
% within Trtmt 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1 Count 0 35 37 53 102 19 246
% within Trtmt 0.0% 14.2% 15.0% 21.5% 41.5% 7.7% 100.0%
2 Count 0 34 35 51 93 24 237
% within Trtmt 0.0% 14.3% 14.8% 21.5% 39.2% 10.1% 100.0%
3 Count 0 24 38 37 86 23 208
% within Trtmt 0.0% 11.5% 18.3% 17.8% 41.3% 11.1% 100.0%
4 Count 0 46 42 45 89 20 242
% within Trtmt 0.0% 19.0% 17.4% 18.6% 36.8% 8.3% 100.0%
Total Count 2 139 152 186 370 86 935
% within Trtmt 0.2% 14.9% 16.3% 19.9% 39.6% 9.2% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 944.701a 20 .000
Likelihood Ratio 38.179 20 .008
N of Valid Cases 935
a. 10 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is .00.
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Treatment: 
1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control 
Responses: 
0- No Response; 1- Strongly Disapprove; 2- Disapprove;          
3- Neutral; 4- Approve; 5- Strongly Approve 
Barack Obama’s Handling of ISIL by Treatment 
Trtmt * USDisc Crosstabulation
USDisc
Total0 1 2 3 4
Trtmt 0 Count 2 0 0 0 0 2
% within Trtmt 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1 Count 0 4 129 66 47 246
% within Trtmt 0.0% 1.6% 52.4% 26.8% 19.1% 100.0%
2 Count 0 3 109 77 48 237
% within Trtmt 0.0% 1.3% 46.0% 32.5% 20.3% 100.0%
3 Count 0 4 101 58 45 208
% within Trtmt 0.0% 1.9% 48.6% 27.9% 21.6% 100.0%
4 Count 0 3 93 90 56 242
% within Trtmt 0.0% 1.2% 38.4% 37.2% 23.1% 100.0%
Total Count 2 14 432 291 196 935
% within Trtmt 0.2% 1.5% 46.2% 31.1% 21.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 947.170a 16 .000
Likelihood Ratio 40.769 16 .001
N of Valid Cases 935
a. 13 cells (52.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.
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Treatment: 
1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control 
Responses: 
0- No Response; 1- Too Tough; 2- About Right;                   
3- Not Tough Enough; 4-The US should not get too involved 
in the situation 
Barack Obama’s Request For New AUMF by Treatment 
Trtmt * Q36 Crosstabulation
Q36
Total0 1 2 3
Trtmt 0 Count 2 0 0 0 2
% within Trtmt 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1 Count 0 198 23 25 246
% within Trtmt 0.0% 80.5% 9.3% 10.2% 100.0%
2 Count 0 193 14 30 237
% within Trtmt 0.0% 81.4% 5.9% 12.7% 100.0%
3 Count 0 177 15 16 208
% within Trtmt 0.0% 85.1% 7.2% 7.7% 100.0%
4 Count 0 188 21 33 242
% within Trtmt 0.0% 77.7% 8.7% 13.6% 100.0%
Total Count 2 756 73 104 935
% within Trtmt 0.2% 80.9% 7.8% 11.1% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 942.229a 12 .000
Likelihood Ratio 36.022 12 .000
N of Valid Cases 935
a. 8 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is .00.
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Treatment: 
1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control 
Responses: 
0- No Response; 1- He was right to ask for the authority to 
continue using military force; 2- He should have continued the 
use of military force without asking for authorization; 3- No 
opinion 
Support for Congressional Approval of New AUMF by Treatment 
Trtmt * Q37 Crosstabulation
Q37
Total0 1 2 3
Trtmt 0 Count 2 0 0 0 2
% within Trtmt 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1 Count 0 151 51 44 246
% within Trtmt 0.0% 61.4% 20.7% 17.9% 100.0%
2 Count 0 146 48 43 237
% within Trtmt 0.0% 61.6% 20.3% 18.1% 100.0%
3 Count 0 132 40 36 208
% within Trtmt 0.0% 63.5% 19.2% 17.3% 100.0%
4 Count 0 151 52 39 242
% within Trtmt 0.0% 62.4% 21.5% 16.1% 100.0%
Total Count 2 580 191 162 935
% within Trtmt 0.2% 62.0% 20.4% 17.3% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 935.727a 12 .000
Likelihood Ratio 29.316 12 .004
N of Valid Cases 935
a. 8 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is .00.
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Treatment: 
1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control 
Responses: 
0- No Response; 1- Should; 2- Should not; 
3- No opinion 
Differences Between Ideologies on Issue Rank by Treatment 
Trtmt * IssueRank * Q47 Crosstabulation
Q47
IssueRank
Total0 1 2 3 4
3 Trtmt 1 Count 7 40 15 4 66
% within Trtmt 10.6% 60.6% 22.7% 6.1% 100.0%
2 Count 5 27 21 5 58
% within Trtmt 8.6% 46.6% 36.2% 8.6% 100.0%
3 Count 14 23 8 5 50
% within Trtmt 28.0% 46.0% 16.0% 10.0% 100.0%
4 Count 8 19 17 12 56
% within Trtmt 14.3% 33.9% 30.4% 21.4% 100.0%
Total Count 34 109 61 26 230
% within Trtmt 14.8% 47.4% 26.5% 11.3% 100.0%
4 Trtmt 1 Count 0 34 10 2 46
% within Trtmt 0.0% 73.9% 21.7% 4.3% 100.0%
2 Count 2 22 9 2 35
% within Trtmt 5.7% 62.9% 25.7% 5.7% 100.0%
3 Count 2 17 8 2 29
% within Trtmt 6.9% 58.6% 27.6% 6.9% 100.0%
4 Count 8 16 5 2 31
% within Trtmt 25.8% 51.6% 16.1% 6.5% 100.0%
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Ideology: 
0- No Response; 1- Very Liberal; 2- Liberal; 
3- Independent; 4- Conservative; 5- Very 
Conservative 
Responses: 
0- No Response; 1- Environment; 2- Foreign 
Affairs; 3- Healthcare; 4-Civil Rights 
Chi-Square Tests
Q47 Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
0 Pearson Chi-Square 10.000b 6 .125
Likelihood Ratio 10.549 6 .103
N of Valid Cases 5
1 Pearson Chi-Square 10.089c 9 .343
Likelihood Ratio 9.909 9 .358
N of Valid Cases 179
2 Pearson Chi-Square 8.929d 9 .444
Likelihood Ratio 9.078 9 .430
N of Valid Cases 339
3 Pearson Chi-Square 24.725e 9 .003
Likelihood Ratio 23.312 9 .006
N of Valid Cases 230
4 Pearson Chi-Square 18.120f 9 .034
Likelihood Ratio 18.262 9 .032
N of Valid Cases 141
5 Pearson Chi-Square 4.878g 9 .845
Likelihood Ratio 6.139 9 .726
N of Valid Cases 41
Total Pearson Chi-Square 951.941a 16 .000
Likelihood Ratio 45.495 16 .000
N of Valid Cases 935
a. 9 cells (36.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.
b. 12 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20.
c. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.84.
d. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.90.
e. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.65.
f. 8 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.65.
g. 14 cells (87.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .07.
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Differences Between Ideologies on Job Approval by Treatment 
Trtmt * ObamaJob * Q47 Crosstabulation
Q47
ObamaJob
Total0 1 2 3 4 5
3 Trt
mt
1 Count 6 12 25 18 5 66
% within 
Trtmt
9.1% 18.2% 37.9% 27.3% 7.6%
100.0
%
2 Count 6 9 24 18 1 58
% within 
Trtmt
10.3% 15.5% 41.4% 31.0% 1.7%
100.0
%
3 Count 9 18 8 11 4 50
% within 
Trtmt
18.0% 36.0% 16.0% 22.0% 8.0%
100.0
%
4 Count 13 16 15 9 3 56
% within 
Trtmt
23.2% 28.6% 26.8% 16.1% 5.4%
100.0
%
Total Count 34 55 72 56 13 230
% within 
Trtmt
14.8% 23.9% 31.3% 24.3% 5.7%
100.0
%
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Ideology: 
0- No Response; 1- Very Liberal; 2- Liberal; 3- Independent; 
4- Conservative; 5- Very Conservative 
Responses: 
0- No Response; 1- Strongly Disapprove; 2- Disapprove;     
3- Neutral; 4- Approve; 5- Strongly Approve
Chi-Square Tests
Q47 Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
0 Pearson Chi-Square 10.000b 6 .125
Likelihood Ratio 10.549 6 .103
N of Valid Cases 5
1 Pearson Chi-Square 19.163c 12 .085
Likelihood Ratio 23.013 12 .028
N of Valid Cases 179
2 Pearson Chi-Square 7.972d 12 .787
Likelihood Ratio 7.962 12 .788
N of Valid Cases 339
3 Pearson Chi-Square 23.837e 12 .021
Likelihood Ratio 24.857 12 .016
N of Valid Cases 230
4 Pearson Chi-Square 7.757f 12 .804
Likelihood Ratio 7.893 12 .793
N of Valid Cases 141
5 Pearson Chi-Square 18.740g 9 .027
Likelihood Ratio 18.617 9 .029
N of Valid Cases 41
Total Pearson Chi-Square 944.701a 20 .000
Likelihood Ratio 38.179 20 .008
N of Valid Cases 935
a. 10 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.
b. 12 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20.
c. 9 cells (45.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.53.
d. 4 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.82.
e. 4 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.83.
f. 8 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.
g. 14 cells (87.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15.
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Difference Between Ideologies on Barack Obama’s Handling of ISIL by Treatment 
 
Trtmt * USDisc * Q47 Crosstabulation
Q47
USDisc
Total0 1 2 3 4
3 Trtmt 1 Count 0 35 19 12 66
% within 
Trtmt
0.0% 53.0% 28.8% 18.2% 100.0%
2 Count 0 26 23 9 58
% within 
Trtmt
0.0% 44.8% 39.7% 15.5% 100.0%
3 Count 0 12 20 18 50
% within 
Trtmt
0.0% 24.0% 40.0% 36.0% 100.0%
4 Count 1 15 21 19 56
% within 
Trtmt
1.8% 26.8% 37.5% 33.9% 100.0%
Total Count 1 88 83 58 230
% within 
Trtmt
0.4% 38.3% 36.1% 25.2% 100.0%
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Ideology: 
0- No Response; 1- Very Liberal; 2- Liberal; 3- 
Independent; 4- Conservative; 5- Very 
Conservative 
Responses: 
0- No Response; 1- Too Tough; 2- About Right; 
3- Not Tough Enough; 4-The US should not get 
too involved in the situation
Chi-Square Tests
Q47 Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
0 Pearson Chi-Square 15.000b 9 .091
Likelihood Ratio 13.322 9 .149
N of Valid Cases 5
1 Pearson Chi-Square 16.468c 9 .058
Likelihood Ratio 17.023 9 .048
N of Valid Cases 179
2 Pearson Chi-Square 11.361d 9 .252
Likelihood Ratio 12.047 9 .211
N of Valid Cases 339
3 Pearson Chi-Square 20.981e 9 .013
Likelihood Ratio 21.004 9 .013
N of Valid Cases 230
4 Pearson Chi-Square 6.250f 6 .396
Likelihood Ratio 6.383 6 .382
N of Valid Cases 141
5 Pearson Chi-Square 5.223g 6 .516
Likelihood Ratio 5.027 6 .540
N of Valid Cases 41
Total Pearson Chi-Square 947.170a 16 .000
Likelihood Ratio 40.769 16 .001
N of Valid Cases 935
a. 13 cells (52.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.
b. 16 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20.
c. 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.74.
d. 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .91.
e. 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.
f. 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.91.
g. 9 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.
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Differences Between Party Affiliations in Issue Rank By Treatment 
Trtmt * IssueRank * Q48 Crosstabulation
Q48
IssueRank
Total0 1 2 3 4
2 Trtmt 1 Count 0 34 9 0 43
% within Trtmt 0.0% 79.1% 20.9% 0.0% 100.0%
2 Count 1 21 5 4 31
% within Trtmt 3.2% 67.7% 16.1% 12.9% 100.0%
3 Count 2 20 10 0 32
% within Trtmt 6.3% 62.5% 31.3% 0.0% 100.0%
4 Count 5 24 8 3 40
% within Trtmt 12.5% 60.0% 20.0% 7.5% 100.0%
Total Count 8 99 32 7 146
% within Trtmt 5.5% 67.8% 21.9% 4.8% 100.0%
3 Trtmt 1 Count 16 45 22 10 93
% within Trtmt 17.2% 48.4% 23.7% 10.8% 100.0%
2 Count 11 32 26 5 74
% within Trtmt 14.9% 43.2% 35.1% 6.8% 100.0%
3 Count 14 25 9 13 61
% within Trtmt 23.0% 41.0% 14.8% 21.3% 100.0%
4 Count 19 25 30 15 89
% within Trtmt 21.3% 28.1% 33.7% 16.9% 100.0%
Total Count 60 127 87 43 317
% within Trtmt 18.9% 40.1% 27.4% 13.6% 100.0%
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Party Affiliation: 
0- No Response; 1- Democrat; 2- Republican; 3- 
Independent; 4- Something Else 
Responses: 
0- No Response; 1- Environment; 2- Foreign 
Affairs; 3- Healthcare; 4-Civil Rights 
Chi-Square Tests
Q48 Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
0 Pearson Chi-Square .b
N of Valid Cases 2
1 Pearson Chi-Square 6.932c 9 .644
Likelihood Ratio 6.860 9 .652
N of Valid Cases 418
2 Pearson Chi-Square 17.863d 9 .037
Likelihood Ratio 21.325 9 .011
N of Valid Cases 146
3 Pearson Chi-Square 19.993e 9 .018
Likelihood Ratio 20.977 9 .013
N of Valid Cases 317
4 Pearson Chi-Square 16.061f 9 .066
Likelihood Ratio 21.070 9 .012
N of Valid Cases 52
Total Pearson Chi-Square 951.941a 16 .000
Likelihood Ratio 45.495 16 .000
N of Valid Cases 935
a. 9 cells (36.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is .00.
b. No statistics are computed because Trtmt and IssueRank are constants.
c. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 14.77.
d. 8 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 1.49.
e. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 8.27.
f. 16 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 1.48.
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